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Information Security awareness initiatives are seen as critical to any 
information security programme. But, how do we determine the 
effectiveness of these awareness initiatives? We could get our employees 
to write a test after the awareness to determine how well they 
understand the policies, but this does not show how they affect the 
employee’s on the job behaviour. Does awareness training have a direct 
influence on the security behaviour of individuals, and what is the direct 
benefit of awareness training? This research report aims to answer the 
question: To what extent does information security awareness training 
influence information security behaviour? 
Technologies meant to provide security ultimately depend on the 
effective implementation and operation of these technologies by people. 
Thus awareness of policies is needed by all individuals in an organisation 
to ensure that policies are well understood and not misinterpreted. Some 
researchers have maintained that educating users is futile mainly 
because it is believed that it is difficult to teach users complex security 
issues and, secondly, because if security is seen as secondary by the user 
they will not pay enough attention to it. 
This research found that, firstly, there is a shortage of in-depth 
information security awareness research and that behavioural concepts 
are not properly taken into account for security awareness programmes. 
There is a shortage of theoretical models explaining how awareness 
training affects behaviour. Secondly, this research tested a proposed 
model empirically using system-generated data as indicators of behaviour 
in a pretest-posttest experimental design. It was found that security 
awareness training was effective in terms of end-users retaining security 
knowledge. However, there was no evidence to suggest that security 
awareness by itself is sufficient to ensure compliant behaviour by end-
users. Security awareness training is a necessary, integral component 
that could influence compliant behaviour, but is not adequate to do so 
fully. Practitioners must insist that their security awareness programmes 
are measured in terms of effectiveness and focus on behavioural aspects 
to complement traditional security awareness initiatives. 
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 CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Users are much more likely to support and comply with policies if they clearly 
understand the purpose for the policies and their responsibilities in regard to the policies.  
 
Information Security Manager for an American state agency (GAO, 1998:49) 
 
 
We live in an age where information is becoming more and more valuable 
(Trompeter & Eloff, 2001:384) and the success of an organisation will to 
a large extent depend on the availability of its information (Finne, 
2000:234). People expect 24/7 access to public and private networks and 
expectations of users are growing. In addition, there are increased 
dependencies on third parties owing to collaborative efforts, continuous 
monitoring for support purposes or outsourcing development.  
Organisations are coming to terms with their growing dependence on 
information and the related communication and information technology 
(IT) components that house and process this information. They are 
learning how to harness these for continued success. 
 
With this increased reliance on IT, organisations, particularly financial 
institutions, are facing escalating information security threats and the 
associated potential impact is also escalating as their dependence on IT 
grows. This has been highlighted by ongoing news reports, independent 
security surveys and other similar reports (Deloitte 2006 Security 
Survey, 2006:13, OECD, 2002:7). The reasons for this increase in 
security threats is mainly due to complexity in systems (Schneier, 
2000,6), convergence of technologies and the interconnected nature of 
systems (OECD, 2002:7).  
 
IT systems are dependent on people. Schneier (2003:10) maintains that 
information security is more about behaviour than anything else, that is, 
getting people to behave in a certain way. Security wants to prevent 
people’s intentional actions and the associated adverse consequences. 
Despite the hype from vendors about the need for security products 
many critical security activities have not and cannot be automated. 
Technologies meant to provide security ultimately depend on the 
effective implementation and operation of these technologies by people. 
This means that organisations are dependent on people to achieve a 
secure environment. Since humans are seen as the “weakest link” in the 
information security chain (Schneier, 2000; Stanton, Stam, Guzman & 
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Caldera, 2003:1; Katsikas, 2000:130; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004:2; 
von Solms, 2000:618), there is a clear requirement to ensure users are 
trained correctly in terms of information security policies. The goal is to 
ensure that users firstly use the necessary policies and thereafter to 
ensure that they are not misused or misinterpreted thereby ensuring the 
effectiveness of policies (Siponen, 2000a:31). Security awareness efforts 
are seen as the “first line of defence” (OECD, 2002:10).  
 
A very real and increasing threat is that of insiders. Insiders are company 
staff, authorised individuals, who have privileged access to IT systems, 
understand the internal processes of the organisation and may have 
some level of technical expertise. All these factors together pose a 
serious threat to the organisation. Insider threats do not only include 
malicious actions but even neutral and accidental errors/threats to the 
organisation. Since the internal threat is a result of incorrect security 
behaviour (Leach, 2003:685) it follows that security awareness initiatives 
to encourage and demonstrate appropriate behaviour is a good idea. The 
OECD guidelines on securing information systems (OECD, 2002:8) agree, 
calling for a “culture of information security”, that is, introducing a new 
way of thinking and behaving when working with information systems. 
 
In January 2001, after completing a study the Department of Transport 
in the United States recommended that all agencies need to focus on 
employee awareness in order to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure. This stemmed from a Presidential Decision Directive 63, 
issued by President Clinton in May 1998, requiring agencies to protect 
the information systems that support the nation's critical infrastructure 
(FCW, 2001).  
 
OECD guidelines also call for greater public awareness and understanding 
of security issues by those who develop, own, manage, service and use 
information systems – whether at a policy or an operational level (OECD, 
2002:7).  
Thus security awareness is seen as essential to any organisation 
concerned about information security (Nosworthy, 2000; von Solms, 
2000; Siponen, 2001; Janczewski & Xinli, 2002; OECD, 2002; Straub & 
Welke, 1998; GAO, 2005); however, is it effective in mitigating threats to 
the organisation? 
 
Reporting on the progress of implementing information security statutory 
requirements in federal agencies, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) of the United States Congress testified to the house committee in 
April 2005. In summary, they reported that although there were 
improvements in addressing information security problems, significant 
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security risks still existed. This is despite an improvement in awareness 
training initiatives by the agencies: 70% of all agencies trained 90% or 
more of their employees, as opposed to 54% of agencies in 2003 (GAO, 
2005:16). This report raises a number of interesting questions: 
• Did the increased awareness training make any difference to the 
security posture of the agencies, that is, was it effective? The 
report mentions that awareness was carried out as required but 
not whether it made a difference or not. 
• The report did mention improvements in security but does not 
state whether this can be attributed to security awareness 
training. 
• Did the training save money and prevent security incidents, that 
is, are the effects measurable? Perhaps the agencies would be 
better off spending relatively more money on other security 
initiatives if their effectiveness could be measured. 
 
More research is required on the outcome and effectiveness of security 
awareness assignments (Schultz, 2004:1; Siponen, 2001:24). 
Information security research has always been skewed towards technical 
aspects of security (Siponen, 2001:24; Stanton et al. 2003:1; Trompeter 
& Eloff, 2001:384). However, it was soon recognised that focusing on 
technical issues alone is inadequate (von Solms, 2000: 615; Schneier, 
2000:xi). Most of the awareness research concentrates on the 
importance of awareness initiatives (Nosworthy, 2000; von Solms, 2000; 
von Solms, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Janczewski & Xinli, 2002) and 
awareness techniques (Gaunt, 2000; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004; 
Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Katsikas, 2000; Johnston, Eloff & Labuschange, 
2003; Thomson & von Solms, 1998) as opposed to research on the 
behavioural aspects of awareness initiatives (Siponen, 2001:26).  
Many authors then argued that since “insiders” (personnel) pose the 
greatest security threat to an organisation, it follows that appropriate 
behaviour must be encouraged in order to enhance the organisation’s 
security position (Janczewski & Xinli, 2002:179; Leach, 2003:685; van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2004:2; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo & Jolton, 
2005:125). 
 
Security management standards such as SABS ISO/IEC 17799 (SABS, 
2000) and the Information Security Forum’s (ISF) The Standard of Good 
Practice (ISF, 2005) also support information security awareness 
initiatives. Unfortunately there is a shortage of in-depth research on 
information security awareness initiatives (Siponen, 2001:24) as will be 
demonstrated throughout this report. 
 
Recent work in behavioural information security has shown: how 
employee job attitude relates to information security behaviours (Stanton 
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et al., 2003); what categories of information security behaviours exist 
(Stanton et al., 2005); what influences information security behaviours 
(Leach, 2003); how attitudes and intentions are significant factors in 
explaining why some employees do not comply with information security 
policies (Pahnila, Siponen & Mahmood, 2007) and how a design theory for 
a security awareness programme was effective and was shown to achieve 
positive results, change user attitudes and, make users more conscious 
about their behaviour. More practical studies of this nature are called for 
(Puhakainen, 2006:106, 114, 139). 
 
However, more research is required on the link between security 
awareness initiatives and the outcomes of such activities: in other words, 
the resultant behaviour of employees in organisations as a result of 
awareness activities. Schultz (2004:1) calls for further research on the 
benefits of information security awareness and training. Next, this chapter 
will describe why the research problem is important and how this report 
will help to address the research problem.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the following:  
• A problem exists – security awareness training is considered 
critical, given the threats facing organisations. However, more 
research is required on the outcome of awareness training 
programmes. 
• The problem is important – the impact of security breaches on 
organisations is potentially significant. The same is true if policies 
are not used, misused or misinterpreted. 
• This research is necessary and will help to solve the problem – by 
measuring the effectiveness of awareness training on end-user 
behaviour lessons will be learned for more effective organisational 
awareness programmes.  
• The research design is viable in order to help solve the problem. 
 
1.1. THE IMPACT ON ORGANISATIONS IS POTENTIALLY 
SIGNIFICANT 
  
The following is a sample of security incidents reported in the press over 
a two-month period in 2006: 
• On 31 August, the UK Home Office admitted that its ID and 
passport services database had experienced five security breaches 
in the previous five years – four of them from so called “insiders” 
(SANS Institute (a), 2006). 
• The Business Software Alliance (BSA) in the UK stated that 
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approximately 80% of software piracy cases that it gets involved 
in are due to “negligence and not malice”. It further urged the UK 
government to educate the public about software licences (SANS 
Institute, 2006a).  
• An Indian call centre employee working in eastern India was 
arrested for allegedly using customer credit card information she 
obtained through her work to purchase items over the Internet 
(SANS Institute, 2006b). 
• On 5 September, Microsoft Word 2000 users were warned of a 
flaw in the application that could allow external attackers to take 
remote control of a target workstation if the owner of the 
workstation opened a specific attachment. At the time of the 
report, Microsoft had not yet issued a patch for the vulnerability, 
and users were advised not to open un-trusted documents (SANS 
Institute (c), 2006). 
 
These incidents are typical of what is reported in the press on a daily 
basis. In the first three quarters of 2003, 114,855 incidents and 2,982 
vulnerabilities were reported to CERT®/CC. Obtaining consistently reliable 
statistics on the scale and impact of computer crimes and other security 
incidents is very difficult mainly because organisations want to avoid the 
associated negative publicity.  
For example, in 2006 the Computer Security Institute (CSI) reported that 
even in an anonymous survey, only 50% of 616 US companies surveyed 
were willing to disclose the financial losses associated with a security 
breach. Of this group however, the survey did report the average annual 
loss of security breaches to be $167,713 (as a result of various reasons). 
Interestingly, there is a substantial increase in the importance of security 
awareness perceived by those surveyed. On average respondents felt 
that their organisations were under-investing in awareness at that time 
(Computer Security Institute, 2006). 
The 2007 CSI Computer and Crime Security Survey shows a large 
increase in the average annual loss experienced by organisations 
compared to the previous year, jumping to $350,424. These 
organisations pointed at financial fraud as being the leading source of 
these losses (Computer Security Institute, 2007:2).  
Another study from the University of Michigan quantified the cost of 
responding to 30 security-related incidents at $1million and 9,000 
employee hours. An extreme example is the direct cost of the Code Red 
Worm outbreak in 2001, which was estimated at $1 billion (for recovering 
and protecting servers), and an additional $1.4 billion for indirect costs of 
the worm (such as lost productivity) (Madigan et al., 2004:47). 
The impact of security breaches on organisations may not only lead to 
financial losses (which in themselves may be very difficult to quantify) 
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but can also include nonfinancial and more subtle consequences. For a 
publicly listed organisation, incidents of data theft could lead to a range 
of consequences such as negative publicity, sanctions and tougher 
regulations imposed by regulators, potential litigation against the 
organisation, impact on market share, doubt in the organisation’s 
systems and staff, and reduction in employee morale.  
Internal abuses of security policies at the workplace (such as dealing in 
pirated software or pornography) may also have negative consequences 
to the organisation in terms of lost productivity. The 2007 CSI survey 
found that this type of abuse was the most prevalent security problem 
experienced by organisations surveyed (Computer Security Institute, 
2007:2).  
Thus, if an organisation does not manage security effectively, the impact 
to an organisation could be very significant. Security practitioners have 
known for years that information security is not just a technical issue 
anymore; it is a multidimensional discipline (von Solms, 2001b:504; 
Finne, 2000:235; von Solms & von Solms, 2001:308). Since the purpose 
of information security is to protect organisational assets from 
unauthorised use (von Solms & von Solms, 2000: 59) and the disciplines 
making up information security are related and interdependent, it follows 
that disregarding one of these leads to potentially significant risks to 
organisations (Von Solms, 2001b:507; von Solms & von Solms, 
2001:308). One such discipline is security awareness efforts since end-
user behaviour is seen as critical in the information security chain 
(Schneier, 2000; Stanton et al. 2003:1; Katsikas, 2000:130; van Niekerk 
& von Solms, 2004:2; von Solms, 2000:618) and, traditionally, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the importance of awareness training.  
Awareness is important because attackers frequently take advantage of 
people’s natural tendency to be helpful and forthcoming in order to get 
into a system (as opposed to attacking the system technically), also 
known as social engineering. For example, in 1994 a Frenchman called 
the FBI pretending to be an FBI representative and convinced the person 
on the other end of the line to help him connect to the FBI phone 
conferencing system. He then ran up a $250,000 phone bill over a 
number of months (Schneier, 2003:143). 
The purpose of information security awareness is to inform a broad 
audience of information security policies using attention-getting and 
user-friendly techniques. The objective is to ultimately make them 
behave appropriately (Katsikas, 2000:130). This is intuitive since in any 
organisation employees cannot be expected to comply with policies 
unless they are aware of them and understand them.  
Neumann (2003, 136), reporting to the US House of Representatives 
committee on computer-communications security in 2001 and later 
repeating his stance in 2003, maintains that information security is in 
fact getting worse relative to the risks. He concludes: “Even if an entire 
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system has been subjected to extremely rigorous open evaluation and 
stringent operational controls, that may not be enough to ensure 
adequate behavior.” 
 
1.2. THIS RESEARCH WILL HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
 
Given the nature of risks they face, organisations could organise an 
awareness campaign and get their employees to write a test afterwards to 
determine how well they understand the policies.  This, however, does not 
mean that the training improves employees’ on-the-job behaviour. How 
do companies determine the benefits of awareness training? Do 
companies become more secure as a result of the end-users’ becoming 
more security aware? If it can be shown that such training results in, say, 
less security incidents or more appropriate security behaviour, then 
obviously this could benefit organisations and industries. 
 
More research is required on the link between security awareness 
initiatives and the outcomes of such activities: in other words, the 
resultant behaviour of employees in organisations as a result of 
awareness activities. 
 
To this end, the following section will summarise the limitations of the 
existing research work on security awareness and thereby reinforce the 
necessity of this research. A more detailed discussion of the state of the 
existing security awareness landscape is presented in Chapter 2. 
1.2.1. Limitations of existing research: the case for further 
research  
 
 
Cognitive research approaches consider the individual to be an active 
processor of information and that their behaviour does not change unless 
the person has a meaningful understanding of information. In the context 
of security awareness research these approaches aim to change behaviour 
through persuasion using awareness interventions. The majority of 
existing security awareness approaches aims to change behaviour 
through the use of training (Puhakainen, 2006:54). Most of the research 
that does propose training has two shortcomings: no underlying theories 
presented and insufficient empirical evidence on the practical efficiency of 
methods (Puhakainen, 2006:54). 
 
One school of thought attributes changes in behaviour to the result of 
changes in environmental variables because of undesirable behaviours. 
For example, abuse of computer systems by employees may be countered 
by disciplinary actions against those employees. So the use of measures 
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to alter behaviour is used, such as punishment and reward for certain 
security practices (Puhakainen, 2006:55). An example of this research is 
the work carried out by Straub (1990). Behavioural security is also 
concerned with what motivates security-related behaviours. The research 
of Pahnila et al (2007), for example, undertakes to explain and provide 
evidence as to why people do not comply with security policies and what 
it is that influences such behaviour. They developed a model to explain 
this and provide an insight into the determinants of behaviour. 
 
The next chapter will show that there is an inadequate understanding by 
practitioners on the various security approaches for security awareness; 
what works well and what does not. The existing research, by and large 
lacks credibility. This is apparent by the security awareness approaches 
discussed by scholars without empirical evidence supporting their practical 
effectiveness (Puhakainen, 2006:30). The only empirical evidence that 
does exist (with respect to information security awareness research) 
shows the practical effectiveness of deterrence. Further empirical 
evidence showing the effectiveness of security awareness training or 
awareness campaigns is not available, even though the effectiveness of 
training and campaign activities has been shown in other fields (e.g. in 
cases where AIDS training has been a successful intervention) 
(Puhakainen, 2006:69,139).  
 
Furthermore, scholars have pointed out that only a few existing studies 
are theoretically grounded (Puhakainen, 2006:149; Pahnila et al., 2007) 
and more work is needed in this regard. Unless explicitly mentioned, all 
the research mentioned in the next chapter lacks a theoretical basis. 
Security awareness research in this context can be categorised as follows: 
conceptual models providing practical guidance for security awareness, 
theoretical models without empirical support and theoretical models with 
empirical support (Pahnila et al., 2007). Puhakainen (2006:56) found only 
seven studies out of 59 that showed a theoretical foundation. 
 
In an attempt to address the shortcomings and limitations of existing 
research, Puhakainen (2006) developed three design theories to explain 
and improve IS behaviour. One of the design theories for IS awareness 
training was tested in two organisations. The research showed that the 
developed theory was relevant for developing practical security awareness 
training programmes. The researcher relied on the feedback from users, 
their colleagues and what they observed to determine the effectiveness of 
the security awareness training programme. This programme was shown 
to achieve positive results, change user attitudes and make users more 
conscious about their behaviour. The author calls for more practical 
studies in this regard (Puhakainen, 2006:106, 114, 139). 
 
However, Puhakainen’s (2006) work has the following limitations. Direct 
observation was not used, instead anecdotal evidence from the 
organisation’s manager, interviews and discussions with employees and 
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“participatory observation” were relied upon, which are susceptible to the 
subject-expectancy effect. Ultimately, the research was reliant on user 
behaviour feedback and Puhakainen admitted that the research results 
were based on the researcher’s interpretation – someone else may have 
come to a different conclusion (Puhakainen, 2006:107).  
 
Kruger, Drevin and Steyn (2006) recommend that system data also be 
gathered to supplement employee surveyed data. For the purposes of 
research it may not be necessary to link specific individuals to specific 
data thus avoiding any ethical concerns that may be raised. They also 
attempt to list potential system data that would be captured for each 
security area. While this is a good idea, the feasibility and usefulness of 
this information is not discussed. More work should be done in this 
regard, that is, more detail should be provided including the type of data 
that should be focused on instead of just referring to “system data” and 
“e-mail system logs”. The researchers plan to determine the applicability 
of this system data in future research work. 
 
Many of the existing studies (such as those carried out by Kumaraguru, 
Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2007) are limited by certain factors such 
as the research being carried out in a lab environment, simulating 
phishing sites (e.g. assessing participants’ ability to identify phishing 
websites without showing them the phishing email messages that would 
typically take someone to such websites). In addition, the participants 
involved were more educated and younger than the general Internet user 
population (typically university students) so the results may not be 
generalisable to other groups.  
 
Scholars (such as Srikwan & Jakobsson, 2007) call for educational efforts 
to demonstrate and place emphasis on the link between behaviour and 
the outcome of that behaviour. They want users to understand not only 
what they must do but why.  
 
Srikwan and Jakobsson (2007:5,6) also contend that some examples of 
educational movies are highly technical in nature, implying they are not 
suitable for the layperson. This research on the other hand is aimed at lay 
people who have a basic understanding of computer usage and as such 
will not suffer from the same problems that the previously mentioned 
example does. 
 
Some researchers have made use of computer games as a security 
awareness tool, such as Sheng, Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, Cranor, 
Hong and Nunge (2007). Although it has been shown that these 
mechanisms may be successful in helping people for example identify 
phishing attacks, this kind of training may have limited flexibility in terms 
of being able to convey various security messages and subtleties.   
 
This research report builds on existing behavioural information security 
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research, puts forward a theoretical model explaining how learning takes 
place and then tests the model empirically. Scholars have called for 
research showing the effectiveness of awareness training since existing 
research material does not adequately answer questions of awareness 
efficacy. To summarise, the following limitations are present with the 
existing research: 
 
• lack of empirical evidence on the efficacy and appropriateness of 
using certain awareness mechanisms 
• lack of a theoretical foundation for most research work 
• lack of direct observation studies of security behaviours 
• inadequate/ineffective learning and educational principles used in 
security awareness techniques 
• susceptibility of much of the research methodologies to the subject-
expectancy effect 
• neglect of some security topics (e.g. mobile computing risks) while 
others are emphasised (e.g. phishing threats) 
• inadequate research on the role that internalised knowledge plays 
(of awareness material) 
 
1.3. INTRODUCING A VIABLE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a high-level 
overview of what methods were used to achieve the objectives of this 
report. A detailed discussion of the design is presented in Chapter 3. 
 
1.3.1. Hypothesis 
 
There seems to be a link between awareness activities and employee 
behaviour with respect to information security. Human action or inaction 
is seen to influence information security. For example, Stanton et al. 
(2005:125) argue that appropriate constructive behaviour by end-users 
and administrators improves information security, while inappropriate 
behaviours can substantially inhibit it.   
 
But how do awareness activities affect information security behaviour? 
Based on the weight given to awareness activities by researchers and 
standards bodies mentioned above, one would expect exposure to 
awareness activities by end-users to have an influence on their behaviour 
and thus the security character of an organisation.  
 
It is intuitively appealing to believe that more awareness leads to better 
security behaviour. What is required is a theoretical basis for explaining 
why we would expect exposure to awareness training would lead to better 
security behaviour. 
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The theoretical foundation of this research work is based on the work by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995:61) who argue that there are two types of 
knowledge and both are needed to help explain organisational learning, 
that is, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. The hypotheses presented 
below are based on this model. The theoretical foundation is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 2.   
 
1.3.2. Variables 
 
The variables involved in this research are described below. 
1.3.2.1. Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 1c  
 
The dependent variable is information security behaviour. The first step in 
measuring security behaviour is to obtain a consistent definition of 
information security behaviour. Stanton et al. (2005:126) developed a 
taxonomy of security behaviours mapped across two factors, namely level 
of technical expertise (either high or low) and, intentions (either 
malicious, neutral or beneficial). The taxonomy resulted in six categories 
of security behaviours that have been shown to cover most information 
security behaviours. The taxonomy is shown in the table below: 
 
 
Table 1: Two-factor taxonomy of security behaviours (Stanton et al :2005) 
Expertise Intentions Title 
High Malicious Intentional destruction 
Low Malicious Detrimental misuse 
High Neutral Dangerous tinkering 
Low Neutral Naïve mistakes 
High Beneficial Aware Assurance 
Low Beneficial Basic hygiene 
 
 
This research focused on security behaviours requiring low technical 
expertise. This is because of the complexity and lack of instruments to 
measure high technical expertise of individuals reliably and consistently. 
Consequently the security behaviours with malicious, neutral and 
beneficial intentions requiring low technical expertise were measured in 
this research and constituted the dependent variable. 
 
The independent variable consisted of a set of security awareness 
exposures where participants viewed an awareness movie and completed 
a test afterwards in three parts. This movie is based on the organisation’s 
acceptable usage policy (AUP).  
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Therefore the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
•  H1a: Naive mistakes (neutral intent): End-user exposure to 
security awareness training on appropriate information handling 
improves secure handling of information. 
 
• H1b: Detrimental misuse (malicious intent): End-user 
exposure to security awareness training on acceptable usage of 
Internet facilities diminishes Internet abuse by end-users. 
 
• H1c: Basic hygiene (beneficial intent): End-user exposure to 
security awareness training on password management best 
practices improves secure handling of passwords by end-users. 
 
1.3.2.2. Hypothesis 2 
 
As with Hypothesis 1, the independent variable for Hypothesis 2 consisted 
of security awareness training. However, the dependent variable is the 
level of internalised knowledge obtained from the training. In other 
words, to what extent does the training (explicit knowledge) lead to an 
internalisation of the material presented (tacit knowledge)? The following 
was tested: 
 
• H2: End-user exposure to security awareness training increases the 
internalisation of security knowledge; 
 
1.3.2.3. Hypothesis 3 
 
The independent variable is explicit knowledge made implicit (internalised 
knowledge). The dependent variable is information security behaviour, as 
in hypothesis 1. Therefore the following was tested: 
 
• H3: Internalised security information is necessary for users to 
enact appropriate security behaviours. 
 
1.3.3. Method/research design 
 
A case study was carried out in an organisation consisting of a population 
of 5,726 employees. In order to draw the sample, stratified random 
sampling was used (Welman & Kruger, 2001:55–56).  
 
An experimental and a control group were used. The experimental group 
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were exposed to security awareness training. Both groups were required 
to write a short test that assessed their level of understating of the 
material presented. This was required to test hypothesis 2, that is, it is 
expected that those who pass the test will be more likely to enact the 
appropriate security behaviours. After the end-users have been exposed 
to security awareness training, on-the-job security related behaviours 
(confirmed by previous research carried out by behavioural information 
security researchers) was observed for both the experimental and the 
control groups.  
 
1.3.4. Validity 
 
The research approach recognised and then controlled threats to internal 
validity of the research, that is, showing unequivocally that exposure to 
security awareness training directly influences on-the-job security 
behaviours or not, and whether internalisation of security knowledge 
influences these behaviours.  The nuisance variables controlled were 
corporate culture, intelligence, socioeconomic status, commitment to the 
organisation, status in the organisation, educational level, tenure and 
previous exposure to security awareness training. According to Welman 
and Kruger (2001:73) the most practical way to control nuisance 
variables is through the use of a control group in conjunction with random 
assignment of end-users to control and experimental groups. 
 
Obviously, a great deal is expected from users during awareness 
initiatives, that is, their time and attention, as well as expecting them to 
absorb the message. This research used a novel approach to convey the 
message to end-users that was both entertaining and not technically 
focused. Since direct observation of the participants took place, problems 
that some surveys suffer from, such as the subject-expectancy effect, 
were eliminated. PayPal (Can you spot phishing – Paypal, 2008), for 
example, provides an online questionnaire for users to test their 
understanding of phishing threats and how they work. Unfortunately this 
does not measure users’ real-world behaviour as, for example, the work 
carried out by Whalen and Inkpen (2005) does. SonicWALL has a more 
realistic and useful “Phishing IQ test” that provides users with sample 
emails and they have to decide whether these are legitimate or not 
(SonicWALL, 2008). Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu and Roinestad 
agree, stating that the multitude of studies which perform general 
evaluations of phishing vulnerabilities largely neglect the subject-
expectancy effect. According to Anandpara et al. (2007:3) there have 
been no previous attempts to gather any empirical data on the 
effectiveness of these phishing IQ tests. 
 
This research report supports the argument of demonstrating a link 
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between behaviour and the outcome of that behaviour, since the policies 
and security requirements were conveyed to the participants through a 
customised movie developed for the organisation. The movie script 
initially showed the unwanted behaviour and its consequences. Thereafter 
the correct behaviour is demonstrated by the actors and the outcome of 
this is also shown. In addition, the movie avoids technical issues that may 
confuse the user. In fact, scholars contend that using a movie format to 
communicate security risks to users seems to offer considerable benefits 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Srikwan & Jakobsson, 2007:5). Using this format 
also addresses some of the concerns raised by scholars such as Kovacich 
and Halibozek (2003:258) and Lafleur (1992:4) about overcoming the 
resistance to awareness by employees and getting users to pay attention 
to awareness material (Kumaraguru et al, 2007a). 
 
The advantage of using a movie in this research is that it is not limited to 
a specific demographic as an interactive game (used by other 
researchers) would be, for example. The added advantage of using a 
movie in this research is the fact that the message is not only reliant on 
language but also on the actions of the characters, thus not being 
constrained to the interpretations of language. Users must understand not 
only what they must do but why (Sheng et al., 2007:5).  
 
 
1.3.5. Data collection and measuring instruments 
 
Information security behaviour is a construct and is measured indirectly 
by measuring specific behaviours requiring low technical expertise. By 
using multiple indicators of information security, irrelevant constructs are 
minimised. The construct validity of information security behaviour 
(dependent variable for hypotheses 1 & 3) is further maximised since 
direct observation is used as a measuring instrument. In addition, more 
than one measure is used to measure security behaviour (Welman & 
Kruger, 2001:136). Therefore, factors such a faking, measurement 
reactivity and socially desirable responses are eliminated. 
 
These behaviours were measured before and after security awareness 
training took place. Through investigative techniques, measures such as 
the strength of passwords used by participants and handling of sensitive 
information were observed and scored. Thus the researcher assessed the 
behaviour of the participants.  
 
Instruments used to measure these security behaviours are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
 
This research will therefore help to answer the following questions: 
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• Does end-user exposure to information security awareness training 
affect end-user security behaviour (whether neutral, beneficial, or 
malicious)? 
• What are the implications for organisational awareness training 
programmes arising from a better understanding of the role of 
security awareness training on behaviour? 
• Does end-user exposure to security training increase the 
internalisation of security knowledge?  
• Does internalised knowledge of security policies lead to users 
enacting correct security behaviours? 
 
In Chapter 2, the information security awareness landscape will be 
introduced and classified.  A broad review of studies on information 
security awareness is undertaken and their limitations, weaknesses and 
areas for improvement are discussed. In addition the theoretical 
foundation of this research is presented. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the research design in detail that was introduced 
above. Each research strategy will be explained with respect to sampling, 
data collection and analysis. The rationale of the strategy is also 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the implemented research strategies 
described in the previous chapters. For each strategy, the results of the 
sampling, data collection and data analysis sections are presented. 
Essentially the results of the statistical techniques used to test the 
research hypotheses are described here. This chapter also builds on the 
outcome of the statistical techniques performed in Chapter 3. The results 
of these techniques are interpreted in light of the hypotheses and the 
literature survey presented in Chapter 2. The implications for the results 
for scholars and practitioners are examined. 
 
Chapter 5 is a conclusion of the research undertaken. An overview of the 
study is presented and a summary of the results is presented. A research 
agenda and recommendations are presented for practitioners and scholars 
to follow. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the limitations of 
this research.  
 
Two appendices are provided in this research report. Appendix A is an 
extract of the Acceptable Usage Policy of the organisation in question. All 
the awareness material discussed in this report is based on this policy. 
Appendix B consists of three security tests that were undertaken by the 
control and experimental group end-users during the awareness training 
initiative. 
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1.4. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter firstly introduced the importance of information security 
awareness in the lives of scholars and practitioners. It demonstrated that 
there is a shortage of in-depth research showing the practical 
effectiveness of information security awareness initiatives and their 
impact on end-users behaviour. The role that individuals play in 
information security is significant and needs further research. 
Understanding the nature of such a relationship will be particularly helpful 
to organisations as they are ultimately dependent on people to ensure 
that their security systems are implemented and managed on a 
sustainable basis.  
 
There are also financial (and non-financial) implications for organisations 
that do not ensure that security is maintained, as reported by various 
security surveys. Organisations are particularly at risk of data theft and 
financial fraud by employees of their organisation who are familiar with 
organisational processes and systems. Given the gaps in the existing 
research literature and calls by researchers for further research the 
subsequent research design was introduced.  
 
This research examines the effect of information security awareness 
training on security related behaviours. A case study of an organisation 
was undertaken to determine whether exposure by employees to security 
awareness training improves their security behaviour at work. This is 
determined by directly observing employee on-the-job behaviour before 
and after security awareness training. In addition, the degree to which the 
training is internalised and its subsequent effect on employee behaviour 
was also examined as a factor that influences security behaviour. 
 
Finally, the outcome of this study will provide a set of tools or techniques 
that future researchers can use to measure user behaviour. Learning 
principles which have been called for by previous scholars have been 
employed to ensure maximum effectiveness of the awareness initiatives. 
For example, previous research has highlighted the need to demonstrate 
exactly what behaviour is required, the consequences of not behaving 
correctly and the need to ensure that immediate feedback is given in non-
compliant situations. 
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 CHAPTER 2 : THE INFORMATION SECURITY 
AWARENESS LANDSCAPE 
 
 
While good user education can hardly secure a system, we believe that poor user 
education can put it at serious harm. 
Srikwan & Jakobsson (2007:1) 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that the research question 
presented in this report has not been replicated before and to present a 
theoretical framework upon which this study builds and extends.  This will be 
done by identifying, analysing and discussing arguments identified in this 
literature survey. Specifically, this chapter will achieve the following 
outcomes: show that the question of the impact of security awareness 
training on security behaviour has not been adequately answered by previous 
research; show that some authors have explicitly and implicitly called for 
further research in this regard; demonstrate that such research is worthwhile 
and necessary and will contribute significantly to the information security 
community; and show that, information security awareness efforts can be 
beneficial. The hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter will be tested 
in Chapter 3. 
 
The aim of this literature survey is not to reflect every paper published on 
information security awareness, but rather to reflect the state of this area of 
research, trends in this area, and shortcoming or limitations in the existing 
literature. I therefore feel confident that the material presented is adequate, 
appropriate and effective in achieving the outcomes of this literature survey 
as mentioned above. This literature survey was conducted by reviewing the 
foremost information security and IT journals. This was done with the aid of 
electronic database journals, such as ACM, Emerald, JSTOR, Science Direct 
and Springer, which greatly assisted me in obtaining the necessary material. 
In addition, the use of Google Scholar was of great help in identifying 
journals and sources of citations. In addition, information security-related 
conference proceedings were also used extensively.  
 
IT systems are dependent on people. Schneier (2003:10) maintains that 
information security is more about behaviour than anything else, that is, 
getting people to behave in a certain way. It is people’s intentional and 
unintentional actions that cause adverse consequences that security wants to 
prevent. Schneier wrote about this in Secrets & lies (2000), in which he says 
that one of the reasons for the book was to correct the notion put forward 
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from his previous book that cryptography was the answer to security. The 
principle he is pointing out is why an attacker would spend time and money 
trying to break an encryption algorithm, for example, when they could more 
easily bribe an employee who has been explicitly given access to the 
information required for their day-to-day activities. Despite the hype from 
vendors about the need for security products many critical security activities 
have not and cannot be automated. This means that organisations are 
dependent on people to achieve a secure environment. Since humans are 
seen as the “weakest link” in the information security chain (Schneier, 2000; 
Stanton et al. 2003:1; Katsikas, 2000:130; van Niekerk & von Solms, 
2004:2; von Solms, 2000:618; Kabay, 2002:35), there is a clear need to 
ensure that users are trained correctly in terms of information security 
policies. The goal is to ensure that users use the necessary policies and to 
ensure that they are not misused or misinterpreted, thereby ensuring the 
effectiveness of policies (Siponen, 2000a:31) and efficiencies of security 
processes. Incorrect security behaviour must be addressed as it is the major 
reason for inefficient security measures (Vyskoc & Fibikova, 2001). 
 
Users need to understand why security must be taken seriously, the benefits 
to them personally (i.e. what they gain from this) and how this will assist 
them in carrying out their job (Peltier, 2000:23). Further, users should be 
given the opportunity to review and accept the necessary policies (Markey, 
1989:85). Security awareness efforts are seen as the “first line of defence” 
(OECD, 2002:10). On the other hand, Van Niekerk and von Solms (2004) 
argue that awareness initiatives, while necessary, are not sufficient to obtain 
the desired results, while other authors simply consider educating users futile 
(Nielsen, 2004; Ranum, 2005; Evers, 2006). 
 
To this end, this chapter will carry out a literature survey on the available 
research. Initially, the phenomenon of information security awareness will be 
examined, including the main themes of information security research carried 
out thus far: the importance of the research as stated by researchers and 
various awareness techniques recommended. Related topics covering 
computer abuse and insider threats will also be discussed. A discussion of a 
theoretical model and how it can be used for information security awareness 
initiatives will be presented. Next, significant work done in the relatively new 
field of behavioural information security will be examined and discussed. 
Finally, this chapter will argue why this research work is both worthwhile and 
necessary.  
 
2.2 INFORMATION SECURITY LEARNING 
 
Before proceeding it is worthwhile to get an understanding of the meaning of 
information security learning.  According to the National Institute of Science 
and Technology (NIST) security learning is on a continuum with “awareness” 
at the one extreme followed by “training” and with “education” at the other 
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extreme (See Figure 1 below). Generally the nature of learning becomes 
more detailed and comprehensive as one moves across the continuum (NIST, 
1998:14). Security awareness is directed at all employees in an organisation 
and is primarily aimed at getting employees to focus on security matters 
using attention-getting techniques (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; NIST, 
1998:15, Hansche, Berti & Hare, 2004:54), so that they are able to 
recognise security incidents and respond accordingly as required. The 
employee is regarded as a passive receiver of information (NIST, 1998:15, 
Hansche et al, 2004:54). Training on the other hand is concerned with 
continued teaching of security skills to groups other than IT security staff. 
For example, teaching web application developers how to code securely is 
considered training according to the NIST definition. Education is focused 
instruction for information security personnel on all aspects of the 
multidimensional Information Security discipline.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Hansche et al. (2004:54) provide some clarity on what security awareness 
initiatives are and why they are required. The basis of their argument is that 
all users must understand the policy and apply good security habits when 
carrying out their duties. This is because it is believed that information 
security incidents are often as a result of inattention on the part of end-users 
(Hansche et al., 2004:56). The initiatives are a way to “raise the security 
consciousness” of employees as some may not be aware of the consequences 
of their actions, they believe (Hansche et al., 2004:55). 
 
The importance of the human element has come to prominence in the 
research community recently, prompting a number of research activities. 
According to Puhakainen, the existing body of research in this regard can be 
categorised into two distinct areas. The first area considers security 
awareness to mean attracting end-users to IT Security issues, while the 
second approach regards IT Security awareness to mean users’ 
understanding IT security and binding themselves to it. Consequently, their 
awareness increases as their attitudes and behaviours change thus causing 
them to secure organisational resources (2006:9–10). However, as will be 
Security Learning 
Awareness Training Education 
Figure 1: Security Learning Continuum (adapted from NIST, 1998) 
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shown below, most of these approaches lack a theoretical underpinning and 
verified results to prove the effectiveness of security awareness. This is 
important as practitioners need to understand why a particular approach is 
expected to have a certain affect and adds to the credibility of the particular 
approach chosen by a practitioner (Puhakainen, 2006:10). 
 
Puhakainen (2006:89) says that the difference between security awareness 
training and security awareness campaigns can be open to interpretation. 
They both want to achieve sustainable attitudinal and behavioural 
improvements towards policies in end-users. The difference (according to 
Puhakainen) is that security training is goal-directed learning through lessons 
which teach the skills and knowledge needed to comply with IS policies. 
Security awareness campaigns are a method to market IS through 
persuasive information-sharing techniques (2006:89). This research report 
adopts this definition of security awareness. 
 
It is well accepted that measuring the effectiveness of any awareness 
programme is key. Hansche et al. (2004:69) provide some insight into how 
this should be done. They believe that informally checking behaviours and 
attitudes should be sufficient and recommend the following to security 
practitioners: 
 
• password cracking 
• obtaining anecdotal evidence by speaking to people at pause areas 
• tracking the number of incidents reported (before and after) 
• clean desk audits 
• tracking of who has reviewed security material (such as policies) 
• distributing surveys or questionnaires in order to get input from 
employees. For example, following up to see what employees 
remember and what worked.  
Although this approach is supported by many scholars (e.g. Kruger et al., 
2006; and see the following sections), a more scientific approach is needed 
since current methods of measuring effectiveness of awareness initiatives are 
not adequate to determine the effectiveness of security awareness training. 
As Hansche et al. themselves state, the measurement must show whether 
the original objectives have been met (2004:70). It is also important to 
ensure that the goal of the security awareness message is clear from the 
start. The goal of any awareness initiative is to ultimately have an effect on 
behaviour or at least try to do so. 
2.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
Since one of the aims of this chapter is to show that the hypotheses in this 
chapter are reasonable, the theoretical foundation upon which this research 
is based will initially be introduced. Thereafter, the hypotheses introduced in 
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the previous chapter will be revisited in light of the objectives of this 
literature survey. 
 
The theoretical foundation of this research work is based on the work by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi. They contend that the main reason why Japanese 
companies excel is because they are good at “organisational knowledge 
creation”, that is, the company creates new knowledge, disseminates it, and 
has it reflected in new products, services and systems (1995:3,4). 
 
Drucker maintains that individuals do and will play a pivotal role in society 
(2003:7). In organisations individuals create knowledge. Organisations are 
dependent on individuals for this since they cannot create knowledge. What 
organisations can do is magnify the knowledge created by individuals and 
make it meaningful across the organisation thus creating a knowledge 
creation process (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995:59). 
 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995:61) argue that there are two types of knowledge 
and both are needed to help explain organisational learning, that is, tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge. They explain that the way an organisation 
learns is by oscillating between the two types of knowledge. Tacit knowledge 
is not tangible and is subjective since it is that which is possessed by 
employees of an organisation. This includes individual beliefs, experiences 
and understandings of the organisation and what the organisation requires 
from them. Tacit knowledge also includes the notion of mental models – it is 
how individuals view reality now and how they envision it in the future. Tacit 
knowledge by individuals is the basis for organisational knowledge creation 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995:60). 
 
Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is codified, formal and easily 
expressed. Examples of explicit knowledge include organisational policies, 
pamphlets, directives and systems. Westerners emphasise explicit 
knowledge, while the Japanese emphasise tacit knowledge. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, however, are of the opinion that these types of knowledge are not 
separate and are actually complementary. The vital assumption of knowledge 
creation is that human knowledge is produced through the social interaction 
of explicit and tacit knowledge which occurs between individuals. Therefore 
organisational knowledge creation spirals out from individuals across 
departmental, divisional and organisational boundaries (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995:61, 72).   
Thus the key to knowledge creation is the conversion of tacit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge in an organisation, and when the interaction between tacit 
and explicit knowledge is elevated dynamically from a lower organisational 
unit in the organisation (e.g. a small business unit) to higher levels in the 
organisation (e.g. divisional level or organisation wide). The theory proposed 
by Nonaka and Takeuchi is based on four modes of knowledge conversion (a 
dynamic and continuous interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge), 
which are in actual fact “the engine” of the knowledge-creation process. Each 
mode produces different outputs. It is this process of knowledge building that 
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this research report focuses on. The hypotheses presented in this report are 
based on these knowledge creation processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995:57,70). 
 
The learning path in an organisation follows four cyclical stages (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995:70, 71): 
 
• Employees share tacit knowledge. 
• Tacit knowledge is made explicit by formalising it (e.g. policies). 
• Formalised knowledge is disseminated (e.g. awareness activities). 
• Employees “learn by doing” and thus explicit knowledge is made tacit 
by employees internalising the explicit knowledge. The cycle then 
starts from stage 1 again and forms an infinite loop. 
 
This research report proposes a theoretical model to help explain how 
awareness training influences behaviour. Since security is dependent on 
human behaviour it makes sense to have a proper security awareness 
programme that takes this into account. Employees are often the greatest 
source of security breaches mostly as a result of their ignorance.  
 
It is further proposed that in order to ensure appropriate security behaviour, 
employees need explicit knowledge of security policies and tacit knowledge 
on how to enact the appropriate security behaviour. This research report 
therefore argues that future security awareness programmes must take 
explicit and implicit knowledge into account. 
 
Figure 2 below puts the model described above in context and shows the 
actual mechanisms that were tested. Firstly, users undergo security 
awareness training (1). This is in the form of security awareness material 
showing correct and incorrect behaviours to which users are exposed. Thus 
the security message is made explicit and disseminated to users (2). As 
argued above, explicit knowledge also needs to be made tacit by users 
internalising it. So, after the awareness material has been presented, users 
were required to write a short test that measured to what extent the 
message had been internalised (3). Thereafter, the actual behaviour of 
respondents were measured to test whether their actual behaviour has 
changed as a result of the awareness training (4) and, whether internalised 
knowledge (comprehension) is needed for appropriate behaviour (5). 
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2.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH HAS NOT ANSWERED THE 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Research carried out on information security has traditionally been slanted 
towards technical aspects of security (Siponen, 2001:24; Stanton et al., 
2003:1; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001:384), typically rooted in computer science 
and mathematics. Security was traditionally seen as a service to be provided 
and not something that was influenced by users. However, it was soon 
recognised that focusing on technical issues alone is inadequate (von Solms, 
2000: 615; Schneier, 2000:xi). Technologies meant to provide security 
ultimately depend on the effective implementation and operation of these 
technologies by people. Many authors then argued that since “insiders” 
(personnel) pose the greatest security threat to an organisation, it follows 
that appropriate behaviour must be encouraged in order to enhance the 
organisation’s security position (Janczewski & Xinli, 2002:179; Leach, 
2003:685; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004:2; Stanton et al., 2005:125; 
Pahnila et al, 2007).  Information security awareness is needed to educate 
users and continually remind them of new threats, with the objective being 
to change the behaviour of the user (Thomson & von Solms, 1998:168). 
Awareness of policies is needed by all individuals in an organisation to ensure 
that policies are well understood. Users need to be aware of security 
requirements in order to ensure that the value of security policies are not lost 
(Puhakainen 2006:4). 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical model explaining the way in which security awareness training affects 
behaviour 
2 
4 
1 3 
5 
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Various branches relating to information security awareness research 
currently exist. The landscape of information security awareness research 
can be categorised as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates one way of making sense of the available information 
security research. Most of the research work can be placed into one of these 
categories.  
 
2.4.1 Research about security awareness techniques and its 
importance 
 
Bray promotes the use of security awareness as a way to avoid security 
breaches. He repeats the old adage that a combination of people, process 
and technology is required (2002:11). Bray provides some practical guidance 
for security awareness for practitioners to follow. 
 
Most of the research falls into this category and concentrates on the 
importance of awareness initiatives (Nosworthy, 2000; Furnell, Gennatou & 
Dowland, 2000; von Solms, 2000; von Solms, 2001; Siponen, 2001; 
Janczewkski & Xinli, 2002) and awareness techniques (Furnell, Sanders & 
Warren, 1997; Gaunt, 1998; Gaunt, 2000; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004; 
Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Katsikas, 2000; Johnston, Eloff & Labuschange, 
2003; Thomson & von Solms, 1998; Cox, Connolly & Currall, 2001; Denning, 
1999; Furnell et al., 1997). Some of this research, is not necessarily based 
on a theoretical model, but instead simply provides guidance on what 
Information 
Security 
Awareness 
Research 
Landscape 
 
Security 
awareness 
techniques & its 
importance 
Computer abuse & 
the insider threat 
Behavioural 
Information 
Security research 
Figure 3: Information security awareness landscape 
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methods to use. Sommers & Robinson (2004:379) show how an awareness 
video and a quiz can be used to train students at a university. However, the 
researchers admitted that they had no way of measuring the effectiveness of 
this intervention. A video was simply shown and respondents were required 
to take a quiz afterwards. McCoy and Fowler (2004:349) also deployed a 
security awareness campaign at a university campus. They too, however, did 
not use any metrics and found that measuring effectiveness of security 
awareness training to be a difficult task to carry out – thus implying the 
importance for this piece of research. Other researchers have also 
demonstrated techniques for information security awareness programmes 
such as Perry (1985:94–95), Spurling (1995:20) Parker (1998:466), Cox et 
al. (2001:12), Desman (2002:x), Kovacich (1998:113) and Markey (1989).   
 
In addition, well-established security management standards, such as SABS 
ISO/IEC 17799 and the OECD guidelines, for information systems security all 
promote the importance of making people aware of security awareness 
issues. The question one has to ask is to what end? In other words, does 
making users more aware lead to more secure behaviour, or are awareness 
campaigns doomed to fail (Stephanou & Dagada, 2008)? This research will 
show that there is a shortage of in-depth information security awareness 
research to answer these questions (Siponen, 2001:24). In addition, 
behavioural concepts are not properly taken into account for security 
awareness programmes (Van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004).  
 
Barman’s (2002:32) approach talks about how to write and implement 
security policies. In order for implementation to succeed the significance of 
information security awareness training should be focused on and should be 
mandatory. End-users need to understand what the policies say and their 
roles as employees in these policies. The use of punishment is advocated and 
encouraged (e.g. withholding salaries until training has been completed). 
Furnell et al. (1997:708) argue that employees need to know, understand 
and accept the necessary security requirements from the organisation. They 
also advocate the use of punishment as a means of enforcement. Gaunt 
(1998:134) also advocates punishment in a sense by stating that employees 
should be denied access to information systems until they have undergone 
information security awareness training. He offers concrete means to achieve 
security awareness - such as ensuring that employees’ conditions of 
employment include security requirements. Gaunt (2000:154) says that 
users should also participate in the development of policies. Not only are 
end-users important but management must also be targeted. Katsikas 
(2000) argues for the need for management to be trained and then puts 
forward a methodology for determining training needs. He stresses that it is 
important that individual needs must first be assessed for training purposes. 
 
In the 2007 Computer Security Institute (CSI) Survey, it is reported that 
there is a substantial increase in the importance of security awareness as 
perceived by those surveyed. For the first time in the survey’s history, 
respondents were also asked how they measure the effectiveness of their 
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own awareness initiatives. Results of this survey may provide further insight 
into the success of security awareness initiatives.  
 
In the 2006 CSI survey, on average, respondents felt that their organisations 
were under-investing in awareness at that time (Computer Security Institute, 
2006). These results imply that organisations do realise the importance of 
security awareness efforts. Thus the need for information security is well 
established, but there is inadequate research on the behavioural aspects of 
awareness initiatives (Siponen, 2001:24; Schultz, 2004:1; Van Niekerk & 
von Solms, 2004; Srikwan & Jakobsson, 2007:2).  
 
2.4.1.1 Problems with current awareness techniques 
 
Despite the understanding that awareness is important, it is unclear whether 
a clear message is being communicated to users in the first place (Gaunt, 
2000:152-153). This is especially true for dynamic, complex threats such as 
phishing attacks. Srikwan and Jakobsson (2007), for example, doubt whether 
a clear message is being communicated to users with respect to identity theft 
threats, specifically on what to do and why it must be done. This is despite a 
vast amount of guidance on this subject being directed at users. South 
African banking clients, for example, are frequently warned about the threats 
of phishing scams (via email, SMS and so on). Are these interventions having 
an effect? Perhaps there is too much information for lay people to digest and 
security practitioners may be unwittingly shooting themselves in the foot. For 
example, the research by Anandpara et al. (2007) shows that even though 
users underwent security education on phishing, the result was not an 
improvement in the ability of participants to identify phishing scams, but 
rather to make participants more suspicious or concerned, which was the 
only measurable effect. 
 
There are other obstacles to training such as human resistance to awareness 
training, which some believe is the main obstacle to effective training 
(Kovacich & Halibozek, 2003:258) and thus their full cooperation is required. 
This resistance to secure behaviour can be overcome simply by using an 
information security awareness programme: promotional component 
(publications) and an interactive component, for example briefings (Lafleur, 
1992:4). Lafleur (1992:4–5) seeks to explore the human characteristic of 
resistance to change and seeks to understand human behaviour in order to 
overcome this resistance. 
 
Does making users more aware lead to more secure behaviour and therefore 
contribute to a more “secure” organisation? This is particularly pertinent 
given the increase in users that fall prey to phishing attacks (Anandpara et 
al., 2007:1). One reason why users fall for phishing attacks might be 
because we do not have a detailed understanding of the many guises that 
attacks might take or the technical sophistication needed to identify a false 
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email for example. This is mainly due to the fact that most users see security 
as secondary and ignore risks as they are not constantly looking for them 
(Anandpara et al., 2007:2). 
 
So, even though methods may be used to make users aware, recipients of 
the security awareness message may not apply what they know whether 
they understand the message or not. Some of the reasons for this are 
because security technologies are difficult to use and consequently not used 
very well. For example, Furnell (2005:274) demonstrates the difficulty that 
users have in finding, understanding and using security features in Microsoft 
Word. In another case, Whalen and Inkpen (2005:137) measured eyeball 
tracking of users when using web browsers and concluded that although 
some security information is viewed (indicating that users were “security 
aware”), users do not interact with it in order to fully understand its 
implications. The study also found that users tend to stop looking for security 
information once they have logged into a site (Whalen & Inkpen 2005:143). 
 
The problem may be more complex than originally anticipated by security 
practitioners. Perhaps the solution is not only to deploy awareness campaigns 
and educate users, but more related to the notion of the ability of users to 
understand risk and make trade-offs (Schneier, 2003:17). In addition, 
attackers take advantage of personnel being naturally helpful in order to 
subvert a system (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Most of the time people are told 
what to do without explaining why they need to do this. This is linked to 
people’s understanding of threats. If they are able to understand the 
underlying threat then they will be able to look for patterns and consequently 
mitigate any threat posed (Srikwan & Jakobsson 2007). Cox et al. echo this, 
arguing that not only should employees understand policies but organisations 
must help them to understand security issues (2001:12). Their research 
proposes methods for increasing awareness in an academic setting. 
 
Although it is established that awareness is important, Srikwan and 
Jakobsson (2007) argue that the effectiveness of secure online education is 
inadequate. Traditional security awareness efforts also seem to have 
inadequate results as witnessed by various news reports documented in the 
previous chapter. Srikwan and Jakobsson (2007) argue that educational 
efforts generally expect too much from the audience, while some people – in 
an effort to make the message more palatable – simplify the message to 
such an extent that the meaning is diluted. 
 
Without an adequate understanding of security requirements and their 
support, security processes are bound to be ineffective (Van Niekerk & von 
Solms, 2004). For example, a well-crafted incident management process is 
useless if an employee is not aware of firstly what a security incident looks 
like and then how to respond to the incident when one is recognised. 
Ultimately, security education in this context becomes inadequate. Thus 
security awareness practitioners need to ensure that there is a connection 
made between what a user knows and what the appropriate behaviour 
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expected from them is. In order for security to be enhanced they need to be 
told not only what to do but why they should do it. Murray (1991:204) holds 
that employees may not understand the inherent risks in their actions and 
thus security problems are as a result of their incompetence. In order to 
overcome this problem the use of security awareness programmes is 
supported.  
 
Security education may inadvertently also have the opposite effect intended 
and enhance the level of risk that users expose themselves to. For example, 
if users are instructed explicitly not to share their credit card details with 
anyone requesting them via email and the attack is changed so that this 
information is requested telephonically, then users could be at risk for simply 
doing what they were told to do. In essence the message needs to be simple 
enough to capture the problem without losing the complexity of the threat. 
This is particularly true for education about phishing attacks (Srikwan & 
Jakobsson 2007). Another case in point is the research carried out by 
Anandpara et al. (2007) mentioned above. 
 
Throughout this research report it will become apparent that some security 
topics are neglected (Srikwan & Jakobsson 2007), while others are 
emphasised. For example, people are not told that they could unintentionally 
introduce malicious codes onto their computer by installing a seemingly 
innocuous program. Thus security awareness practitioners need to ensure 
that there is a connection made between what a user knows and what the 
appropriate behaviour expected from them is. In order for security to be 
enhanced they need to be told not only what to do but why they should do it. 
 
The other challenge with security education is to ensure that users actually 
use the material that is available. Some researchers have considered 
educating users futile (Nielsen, 2004; Ranum, 2005; Schneier, 2006; Evers, 
2006), and it was mentioned previously that generally getting the correct 
message across can be difficult. 
 
2.4.1.2 Alternative awareness techniques  
 
Despite the challenges with security education as mentioned above, 
Kumaraguru et al. (2007a) proved that security awareness material – when 
used – may be effective. They found that online material that informs users 
about the threats of phishing was highly effective and that it resulted in an 
improvement in the ability of users to identify phishing sites. Kumaraguru et 
al. also surmise that the reasons why it is believed that teaching users about 
phishing attacks is not effective are twofold: Firstly, it is believed that it is 
difficult to teach users complex security issues and, secondly, since users 
perceive security to be of secondary importance they do not pay enough 
attention to it (2007a). Their research demonstrated that it is possible to 
overcome the first reason – by teaching users simple principles the users 
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were able to identify most phishing scams. The second reason could be 
overcome by devising unique ways in which to deliver the message to the 
user and to ensure that their attention was held. These researchers also call 
for investigations into more effective techniques for delivering the awareness 
message, inducing users actually to read and to absorb the material and to 
ensure that more research which examines the quality of awareness 
materials presented is conducted. Srikwan and Jakobsson (2007), for 
example, call for the behaviour of end-users to be emphasised in awareness 
campaigns. Despite the positive results achieved by Kumaraguru et al. 
(2007) and his colleagues, the research was carried out in a laboratory 
environment on students. Therefore, this study like so many others, suffers 
from the subject-expectancy effect. The subject-expectancy effect refers to a 
cognitive bias that occurs when a subject expects a given result and, 
therefore, unconsciously manipulates an experiment or reports the expected 
result, partly to avoid embarrassment (Ananpara et al., 2007:3).   
 
As demonstrated by Kabay (2002), one way of holding the attention of users, 
inducing them to absorb the message and educating them more effectively, 
is through the use of the principles of social psychology. Kabay (2002) did 
this by addressing user group behaviour in order to render users more 
receptive to security policies and to bring about a positive change in their 
beliefs and attitudes in respect of IS security. The use of sanctions is strongly 
advocated (Kabay, 2002:35).  
 
Furnell et al (2002:356) attempt to add context to security education by 
introducing security training software in terms of which scenarios are 
presented and users are expected to select the most appropriate control for 
the specific situation. This tool is useful as it provides an environment for 
users to simulate the use of countermeasures within an environment and it 
provides a practical method with which to enhance security. However, this 
approach, although a step in the right direction, does have limited 
applicability – it is geared towards small organisations and specific situations. 
In addition, the content may be best suited for individuals with a technical 
background, or else suited to a particular organisational culture – a small IT 
start-up company. No measurement of the effectiveness of the tool that was 
developed was carried out and, since this was a simulated experiment, it is 
unclear whether the same results would apply in the real world. Finally, 
Furnell et al. (2002) do not provide a theoretical foundation on which this 
research is based.  
 
Further research in contextual-based training has been undertaken recently. 
There has been research in which social engineering techniques have been 
used against employees in their work environment. For example, Ferguson 
(2005:55) sent an official-looking internal email to a number of cadets to 
determine whether they would click on the bogus link it contained. His study 
found that 80% of the sample (512 participants) did click on the link, despite 
the fact that they had undergone four hours of information security 
awareness training (Ferguson, 2005:56). Ferguson merely used the results of 
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this experiment as an awareness tool. Users must not only learn but they 
must be able to experience what is required in order to learn and, thereby, 
influence attitudes. The goal of awareness is to influence attitude. There are 
a number of gaps in this research work. Firstly the research looks at one type 
of security behaviour only. Secondly, Ferguson admits that training is not 
enough but, nevertheless, the effectiveness of training was not measured to 
ascertain whether or not it had made a difference. A control group was not 
used. Finally, this research shows that security professionals may expect too 
much from employees. For example, in this case the participants were 
expecting an email so it may have been unfair to expect them not to click on 
the link in the spoofed email that did appear legitimate. It may, for example, 
be too much to ask of our employees not to click on web links, as this is an 
integral part of the work environment and people click on them everyday. 
 
Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson and Menczer, (2007:96) also used contextual 
phishing. They demonstrate that a large amount of information (accessible 
via social networking sites on the Internet) was easily obtainable and could 
effectively be used for phishing attacks. The researchers also wanted to 
measure the way in which social context information could influence the 
success of phishing attacks. They confronted challenges in carrying out 
human subject research experiments and had to adhere to federal standards 
in this respect. They also used a control group. The difference with this 
research is that these researchers tricked the users by spoofing emails that 
appeared as if they had come from friends in the users’ social network. 
Seventy-two percent (out of 487 targeted students) of the students were 
taken in by the (harmless) phishing attack – this was a much higher 
percentage than had been anticipated (Jagatic et al., 2007:97). These 
researchers provide a baseline for successful phishing attacks and they also 
raise a number of interesting ethical questions in respect of researching 
social engineering attacks. They do, however, believe in the need for security 
awareness interventions to raise the awareness of end-users about phishing 
attacks but they are not sure how to measure the success of such awareness 
initiatives. This research does leave a few questions unanswered – what 
about other security-related behaviours (such as choosing a strong 
password) and would measuring other behaviours be as successful as it was 
with the phishing attacks? Also, the focus of this research is not to attempt to 
find a link between awareness training and the way in which end-users 
behave in terms of security. The researchers provided a stimulus, observed 
the resultant behaviour and reported on it – an effective research approach 
for their purposes. 
 
Anandpara et al. (2007:1) show that, in their experiments, phishing tests 
(that determine whether users are able to identify phishing scams or not) are 
not in the least effective. Nevertheless, their findings did prove increased 
concern on the part of the participants (in respect of phishing attempts) but 
not the ability to identify phishing attempts after they had read phishing 
security awareness material. In addition, these researchers also showed that 
the various security indicators on emails that much of the security awareness 
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material warns users to be on the alert for may easily be spoofed by 
phishers. They, therefore, imply that such forms of security awareness 
messages are ineffective. The tests that they carried out took the form of 
email screenshots that users had to study and identify as legitimate or not.  
The tests were administered both before and after the participants had been 
exposed to security awareness material on phishing. Anandpara et al. 
(2007:1) show that a high score is not necessarily an indication of an ability 
to identify phishing attempts. This research lacks real-world context and may 
skew the judgement of a test taker since static screens were presented to 
the user. Also, since the test takers are aware that they are being tested 
their level of suspicion may be heightened beyond what is normal as they will 
be expecting to be tested, although the researchers do maintain that their 
methodology took this into account.  
 
Based on an assessment of students who had attended classroom training on 
phishing attacks, Robila and Ragucci (2006) demonstrate that such 
classroom training is effective. Their research focused on context-aware 
phishing, which may make users more vulnerable to phishing since these 
attacks contain user-context information as opposed to regular phishing 
(2006:237). For example, the group that participated in this survey was 
surprised that attacks could be launched by spoofed university or social 
networking sites (2006:241). Robila  and Ragucci (2006) argue that a new 
education strategy is required to combat phishing threats and that this new 
strategy should combine regular IQ test phishing tests (request participants 
to identify whether an email is a phishing email) and classroom discussion 
training. They propose a way in which phishing education may be used as a 
tool – exposing students to the message and then teaching them how to 
identify phishing threats. They taught users what to look for and they then 
proceeded to show them legitimate and fraudulent emails in an attempt to 
determine whether they were able to identify fraudulent emails. 
 
Thus researchers such as Anandapara et al. (2007) and Robila and Ragucci 
(2006) were able to demonstrate that it was possible for them to measure 
the effect of exposure to security awareness material although each research 
did produce different results. Thus hypothesis 1 of this research – end-user 
exposure to security awareness training has an effect on specific security 
behaviours – may be regarded as plausible. This research also considers 
another two hypotheses, hypothesis 2 – end-user exposure to security 
awareness training increases the internalisation of security knowledge – and 
hypothesis 3 – internalised security information is necessary in order for 
users to enact appropriate security behaviours. 
 
Very recently there has been some work carried out which looks at ways in 
which training may become more effective and how to stimulate the interest 
of users in training material. In this respect the concept of “embedded 
training” and other novel methods will now be further explored. 
 
Kumaraguru and his colleagues (2007b:907) also carried out research within 
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a laboratory environment to determine the effectiveness of various security 
messages that warned users when they were doing something dangerous 
and the way in which individuals use this knowledge in various situations. 
They term this type of training “embedded training”. Embedded training 
teaches users about phishing during their normal use of email. They found 
that common security notices warning about phishing attacks (typically sent 
out by commercial banks) were ineffective mainly because users are not able 
to understand why are they receiving these security notices and they are also 
not able to relate to the intangible problem being described (Kumaraguru et 
al., 2007:912). The researchers found that their embedded security 
messages were more effective than regular security messages in terms of 
the susceptibility of users to be duped by phishing attacks both before and 
after training interventions. They adhered to the principles of learning 
science in the design of their training interventions (Kumaraguru et al., 
2007b:913). This research provides good insights into effective training 
methods. However, the study is affected by the subject-expectancy effect 
since a laboratory environment was used. Two methods were used for the 
embedded training and it was found that both these methods were more 
effective than regular security notices – this emphasises the importance of 
this type of training and of using learning principles in security awareness 
training. 
 
Further research carried out on embedded training has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of this type of training. It has also proved that users retain 
more knowledge as a result of embedded training than they do after non-
embedded training and that they were able to transfer this knowledge in that 
they were able to identify other types of phishing attacks more effectively. 
This was proved by testing the extent to which users retained the knowledge 
they had been taught after one week and their ability to use or “transfer” it 
to other types of phishing attacks (Kumaraguru et al., 2007c:70).  
 
Whereas embedded training focuses on teaching users to spot phishing 
emails related research focused on teaching users to detect phishing 
websites. In the latter the researchers used a computer game that had been 
developed for users. As users played the game they learnt how to spot 
phishing attempts. It was found that users who had played the game were 
more proficient at identifying fraudulent (phishing) websites than those who 
had used the existing online training material as well as other material. The 
researchers are of the opinion that this is due to the content of the material 
and the interactive nature of the game (Sheng et al., 2007:88, 98). 
 
2.4.1.3 Summary 
 
As discussed in this section, previous research on information security 
awareness has been skewed towards awareness techniques. Although recent 
research has started examining the effectiveness of security awareness 
 33 
 
training the focus has been on phishing threats. This type of training has 
shown the effectiveness of classroom based training; email based training 
and web-based awareness material. The measuring of the effectiveness of 
overall security awareness, such as compliance with an acceptable usage 
policy within an organisation, and the examination of behavioural aspects has 
been largely neglected. In addition, very few theoretical models have been 
presented and used in order to explain and to test security behaviours. 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Computer abuse and the insider threat  
 
 
The 2007 CSI survey reports that insider abuse was perceived by the 
respondents as the most prevalent security problem within organisations.  
For example, in January 2008, a man pleaded guilty to intentional damage to 
a “protected computer system”. The man had planted a logic bomb on a 
hospital computer system. He had previously been hired by the hospital to 
develop a training program and had deployed the logic bomb on the system 
at that time.  A few months after he had left the hospital the malicious 
software disabled the application he had developed – effectively rendering 
the hospital computer system unusable (FBI, 2008).  
 
In another incident Ron Harris used his status as a computer laboratory 
technician for the Nevada Gaming Control Board between 1992 and 1995 to 
modify software that would rig slot machines to pay out jackpots in his 
favour (Schneier, 2003). 
 
These stories are but two examples out of thousands of stories related to 
insider threat to organisations and computer abuse. Data theft also continues 
to be a major source of concern for organisations and it has impacted very 
severely on certain organisations. Some writers argue that it is impossible to 
protect organisations against insiders or “authorised abuse” (Dark Reading, 
2007). The crux of the problem for organisations is that, even though they 
may secure their systems against hackers, database and system 
administrators are explicitly accorded full privileged access to the systems for 
administrative purposes. This, coupled with the administrator’s technical 
knowledge and understanding of internal processes, makes computer abuse 
by insiders a serious risk to organisations. Therefore it has been argued 
historically that security awareness is important and that it may play a role in 
this context to combat these types of threats by 
 
• alerting the colleagues of malicious employees to potential suspicious 
behaviour by explicitly stating what types of security behaviour are not 
allowed and how to report incidents 
• acting as a deterrent to insiders if they are aware that they are being 
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monitored  
• demonstrating due diligence on the part of the organisation in the 
event of disciplinary hearings being required 
 
 
Much emphasis has been placed on the role of awareness in order to enhance 
vigilance on the part of employees in terms of security. Mitnick and Simon 
(2002:250) call for organisations to ensure ongoing security awareness to 
defend against, for example, social engineering attacks. The goal is to 
persuade employees to alter their behaviour and attitudes by motivating 
their employees to protect the organisational assets. Mitnick and Simon 
(2002:250) advocate the showing of a security film to render the security 
message more appealing to the audience. They also argue in favour of 
rewards and punishment to support the results of awareness training 
programmes (Mitnick & Simon, 2002:258) and, thereby, influence behaviour.  
 
2.4.2.1 The role of deterrence in computer abuse 
 
The emphasis of research on computer abuse and insider threats is on 
malicious employees and the focus on sanctions as will be explained further 
on. Merely making these types of employees aware of security policies for 
the sake of doing so becomes ineffective unless sanctions are imposed.  
 
There are alternative countermeasures to be considered in this context. 
These countermeasures to avoid security breaches as proposed by Beatson 
(1991) include using psychological profiles, the surveillance of individuals and 
the application of the principle of least privileges.  These are all implemented 
by means of the imposition of security policies and enhancing security 
awareness through security awareness training. Beatson argues that this 
would enable employers to recognise disgruntled employees before they 
could inflict much damage. 
 
The majority of the studies on computer abuse by the users of IT systems 
have been based on the general deterrence theory (Lee & Lee, 2002:58). 
This theory maintains that computer abuse ceases when users are 
threatened.  Detmar, Straub and Nance (1990:53) also made use of the 
general deterrence theory and found that, among other things, a high level 
of discernable investigative activities work well in preventing computer 
abuse. Their study also examined the way in which computer abuse incidents 
are discovered and how perpetrators are disciplined (Detmar et al., 
1990:45). 
 
Straub and Welke’s (1998:445) work on the general deterrence theory 
(traditionally used to explain criminal behaviour) maintains that active and 
visible information security activity dissuades individuals from abusing 
computer resources since the perceived punishment, if caught, outweighs the 
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risk. They further argue that actions on the part of managers may deter 
computer abuse, for example, information security awareness programmes. 
Their work explores whether managers are fully aware of those actions which 
have been shown to lead to lower system risks. 
 
Straub’s (1990:2) seminal work on the practicality of deterrence shows that: 
weekly hours dedicated to IT security and security in general, dissemination 
of IT security polices and guidelines, unambiguous communications to 
employees regarding the consequences of non-compliance and the use of IT 
security software were found to be the most effective IT security deterrents. 
He suggests that widely advertised efforts to detect non-complaint behaviour 
comprises a significant deterrent (Straub, 1990:19). He, therefore, 
recommends and promotes the use of sanctions in cases of known violations 
and maintains that such sanctions will have a deterrent effect on employees. 
This work is significant as it is a theory testing study which provides 
empirical evidence for the general deterrence theory. 
 
In another study Straub, Carlson and Jones (1993) showed how users may 
be deterred from cheating on a programming assignment and suggests a 
number of steps that could be taken by managers in order to prevent 
computer abuse. These steps include encouraging the correct use of systems 
and stressing the fact that violations will lead to sanctions. This study also 
provides empirical support for the general deterrence theory. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Beyond deterrence as a countermeasure 
 
Lee and Lee (2002:57) posed the question as to the reason why security 
policies, awareness activities and security systems are not effective as 
deterrents (despite the fact that they are have been widely regarded as 
such) and why computer abuse still persists. They suggest that it is because 
organisations have not applied the general deterrence theory correctly, and 
because the theory does not cover all the factors which lead to computer 
abuse (Lee & Lee, 2002:60).  The research by Lee and Lee (2002) extends 
the computer abuse model (based on general deterrence) and explains the 
phenomenon in terms of social bonds and learning principles. They 
recommend that both technical and social solutions should be implemented 
in order to solve the problem of computer abuse. Their model is based on the 
assumption that the behaviour of an individual is determined by behavioural 
intent. These intentions are, in turn, affected by attitudes and social theories 
(2002:60) which may be shown to affect computer abuse decisions. For 
example, it has been shown that there is a strong positive correlation 
between a friend’s involvement in computer abuse and the probability of 
computer abuse. Thus security awareness may be seen as another tool with 
which to limit computer abuse. 
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Thus, since most of the computer abuse studies are seen through the lens of 
the general deterrence theory security awareness activities are perceived as 
a preventative measure. Studies on computer abuse have focused on 
“insiders” with malicious intent with the threat of sanctions as the most 
effective deterrent and awareness initiatives used a medium to convey the 
message. Thus computer abuse research is focused on negative behaviour 
and does not demonstrate the effect of awareness training on behaviour. 
 
Since it is widely accepted that the most significant threat to the security of 
an organisation is its staff (Gaunt, 2000:152) more contemporary 
researchers have focused on other relevant factors such as the importance of 
staff attitude (and, in turn, a demonstration of commitment on the part of 
key leaders within the organisation). In addition, other factors such as 
perceived security threat and the perceived self-capability actually to affect 
the necessary behaviours are also seen as factors which affect security 
behaviour (Woon, 2005:367). This type of research will be examined further 
in the following section on behavioural information security. 
 
2.4.3 Behavioural information security 
 
The importance of inducing individuals to act correctly has always been 
implied in previous research work. However, recently there has been a more 
explicit focus on the behavioural aspects of security. Behavioural information 
security is a branch of information security research which examines those 
factors which motivate security related behaviours in computer users. Recent 
work in behavioural information security has also demonstrated the way in 
which employee job attitude relate to information security behaviours 
(Stanton et al., 2003); categories of information security behaviours 
(Stanton, et al., 2005); factors influencing information security behaviours 
(Leach, 2003); the way in which attitudes and intentions constitute 
significant factors in explaining the reasons why certain employees do not 
comply with information security policies (Pahnila et al., 2007) and how a 
design theory for a security awareness programme was effective and was 
shown to achieve positive results, change user attitudes and make users 
more conscious of their behaviour. More practical studies of this nature are 
called for (Puhakainen, 2006:106, 114, 139). 
 
Kajava and Siponen (1997:113) adopt a human-centric perspective when 
they state that the awareness approach must understand and respect human 
factors in order to obtain buy-in from employees into the security awareness 
initiatives. This focus on the human element is also supported by Perry 
(1985:92). An example of this approach entails ensuring that the security 
requirements do not interrupt/impact on employees too heavily (Kajava & 
Siponen, 1997:111). This view is supported by Parker (1998) who calls for 
security to be made part of an employee’s job performance, thus eliminating 
conflicts between security and job requirements. 
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2.4.3.1 The influence of social psychology  
 
Certain researchers have also linked their research to the field of social 
psychology. Siponen (2000a:33–34) argues for awareness programmes to be 
based on behavioural theories. Security practitioners should persuade users 
of the reasons why it is important to follow guidelines by means of a 
framework which targets the motivations and attitudes of end-users. This 
would ensure that they internalise and comply with the policies. Accordingly 
he proposes a framework for persuasive approaches grounded in ethics and 
morals (Siponen, 2000a:37–38). Siponen’s framework (2000a) is based on a 
number of theories including the theory of reasoned action and the theory of 
planned behaviour. 
 
Aytes and Connolly (2003) propose a theoretical model based on social 
psychology to attempt to explain the reasons why employees engage in 
behaviour that contravenes information security policies. The model proposed 
is based on the user’s perception of risk and the choices made based on that 
perception. A user’s knowledge (such as the consequences of certain 
behaviours) is informed by various resources within his/her environment (for 
example, colleagues, systems, policies, training). It follows that a user’s 
perception determines the specific behavioural choices which drives actual 
behaviour (for example, whether to abide by a policy or not). Such behaviour 
then has an outcome which feeds back into the user’s knowledge and 
perceptions. Briefly the user’s behaviour is affected by his/her perceptions of 
the personal and organisational trade-off of the behaviour (Aytes & Connolly, 
2003:2028–2029). Their model is based on previous work in respect of 
human perception and reactions to risk.  
 
Thomson and von Solms (1998) also drew on principles from social 
psychology and called for these principles to be deployed to improve practical 
effectiveness of IS security awareness. Their goal was to increase the 
understanding of user attitude. 
 
Kruger and Kearney (2005) developed a prototype for measuring the 
effectiveness of a security awareness program that was delivered within a 
global organisation. The model that they developed was based on techniques 
from the field of social psychology which maintain that individuals respond in 
a certain way because of three factors, namely, affect (emotions about 
something), behaviour (intention to act in a certain manner) and cognition 
(belief about an object). Kruger and Kearney (2005) then translated these 
factors into a model that could be measured, that is, what a person knows 
(knowledge), how the person feels about a topic (attitude) and what the 
person does (behaviour). These three dimensions are measured in order to 
determine the effectiveness of the awareness programme. Information was 
gathered using questionnaires (including assessing intended behaviour) 
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although they do suggest using system data at a later stage.  
 
Thus the actual behaviours of the employees were not measured in order to 
determine whether there had been a difference effected in these behaviours. 
Kruger et al. (2006) also recommend that system data be gathered to 
supplement employee surveyed data and propose a basic list of source data 
from systems that could be used and also the purpose for which this source 
data could be used. 
 
The work by Kruger et al. (2006) also makes use of the value–focused 
procedures proposed by Keeney (1996:537). These procedures are used to 
illustrate cause-effect relationships, and show how the decisions taken by 
managers of an organisation were motivated by the values of those 
managers. This methodology was then used by the organisation in question 
to identify the areas of security on which to focus (Kruger et al, 2006). This 
is a meaningful piece of research and there is merit in examining this value-
focused approach and security objectives more closely in the future. 
 
Pahnila et al. (2007) proposes a theoretical model that is used firstly to 
elucidate those factors which contribute to employee compliance with 
security policies and, thereafter, ways in which this compliance may be 
enhanced. This model is then validated empirically. Pahnila et al. (2007) 
maintain that one of the key factors in assessing whether users comply with 
security policies is determined by the strength of the users’ intention to do 
so. They hypothesise that this, in turn, is determined by sanctions. They 
demonstrate the complexity of security behaviour by postulating that 
compliance with policy, in fact, comprises the intentions and attitudes of 
employees (which are, in turn, determined by various factors). They, 
therefore, recommend that promoting positive social pressure on employees 
with respect to compliance with security policies (for example, by all levels of 
management and also peers within organisations) enhances actual security 
compliance. This should be done by stating explicitly what is required and the 
correct behaviour should be demonstrated by senior management. This is in 
line with research carried out by Leach (2003). One of the factors that 
influences user security behaviour is what is conveyed to the users. In most 
organisations this communication takes the form of security policies and 
security awareness initiatives (Leach, 2003:686). Another influencing factor 
in this regard is what the employees perceive to be happening around around 
them. Employees are strongly influenced by their peers and by the messages 
which are sent out by the organisation – whether internally or externally. If 
employees perceive inconsistencies and contradictions between the message 
and the actual behaviour within the organisation these perceptions will 
ultimately influence their behaviour (Leach, 2003:687). 
2.4.3.2 Security Culture 
 
Standards bodies and researchers have also highlighted the importance of 
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security culture and its relationship to security awareness. In order for 
appropriate behaviour to take effect a security culture needs to be in place 
within the organisation. It, therefore, follows that, in order for such a culture 
to be in place, it is essential to educate the employees (Van Niekerk & von 
Solms, 2004). Martins and Eloff (2002:206) present a model of security 
culture and a tool with which to measure it that may be utilised to improve 
the security culture within an organisation (2002). The model focuses on 
three levels within an organisation – organisational, group and individual. 
These researchers believe that human behaviour needs to be taken into 
account in addressing cultural security issues. This may be achieved by 
initially ensuring that each employee is informed through security awareness 
training so that they are aware of what is expected of them. Thereafter the 
group and organisational levels are dealt with to influence the culture one 
level at a time. Other factors such as the values and beliefs of individuals 
may also affect end-user behaviour. Thus, even though an employee may 
have fully understood the policy he/she may not act as required if there is a 
conflict with his/her belief system (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).  
 
Schlienger and Teufel’s (2002) model for information security culture 
explains the way in which the cultural theory may help to enhance the overall 
security within an organisation. The most important aspect of security culture 
is the requisite standard of behaviour on the part of managers, the training 
of employees and rewards for good behaviour. This view is echoed by Gaunt 
(2000:151, 157) who believes that information security awareness 
initiatives, while important, do not guarantee that staff will manifest the 
appropriate security behaviours. With reference to the healthcare community 
he argues that a security culture needs to be entrenched for security to be 
effective. This requires, inter alia, strong commitment on the part of senior 
management, and clear lines of accountability and responsibility (Gaunt, 
2000:157; Kajava & Siponen, 1997; Mitnick & Simon, 2002:252). 
 
Vroom and von Solms (2004:191–192, 194, 197) have also recognised the 
importance of human behaviour in the security chain but from an auditing 
perspective. They put forward the argument that, although auditors express 
an opinion on the financial and IT setup of an organisation employee 
behaviour – a key aspect of information security - is not measured. They 
claim further that the reason that end-user behaviour is often neglected is 
because it is so very difficult to measure and that such measurements will 
inevitably be flawed. The auditing of end-user behaviour is compared to the 
carrying out of employee performance appraisals and the resultant flaws 
associated with this activity – reliability and validity. They believe that there 
are too many factors that may interfere with the accurate “auditing” of the 
employee. They, therefore, propose an alternative approach for the auditing 
of behaviour and suggest that it might be preferable to attempt to change 
organisational culture one level at a time and, thereby, influence end-user 
behaviour. 
 
The work of Vroom and von Solms has significant implications for this study. 
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The fact that this study demonstrates that it is possible to measure 
behaviours both contradicts and adds a new dimension to the notion put 
forward by Vroom and von Solms. In addition, the techniques used and the 
lessons learned will form the groundwork for further research work. 
 
According to Gaunt’s studies (2000:152–153) there are a number of 
obstacles that need to be overcome to ensure that security measures are 
effective and a culture of security instilled. These obstacles include the 
following:   
 
• Users may have become accustomed to using the computer systems in 
an insecure way and this would make it more difficult to induce them 
to change their behaviour. The enforcing of stronger security measures 
may, in reality, cause greater reluctance on the part of employees to 
change their behaviour. In addition employees may view security 
measures as impractical and a hindrance to their work. 
• Being unaware of exactly what is required of them may also bring 
about a reluctance to embrace security. 
• Inconsistent application of policies among or within organisations may 
lead to frustration on the part of employees and this may, in turn, 
undermine the effectiveness of the policies. 
 
Gaunt’s (2000) research provides insight into the obstacles confronted by 
practitioners although his work does lack a theoretical basis. It does, 
however, indicate the nature of the problem. 
 
2.4.3.3 Ethical foundations 
 
There has also been research work carried out that highlights the role of 
ethics in terms of security behaviour. Banrerjee, Cronan, Jones (1998:31) 
concur with Leach’s stand about the fact that correct behaviour must be 
demonstrated by leaders within the organisation, but they view behaviours 
through an ethical lens. They identify situational circumstances which 
influences the ethical intentions of users when users are faced with ethical 
dilemmas. After carrying out an empirical study to test their theory they 
concluded that the intention on the part of employees whether to act 
ethically in the workplace is influenced by the way in which they perceive 
their organisational environment and conditions, and their moral obligation to 
behaving correctly. These researchers propose that the solution would be to 
ensure that the ethical requirements of the organisation are made clear to 
employees and that there are strong deterrents to incorrect security 
behaviour in place (Banrerjee et al., 1998:49). Thus the significance of 
security awareness in conveying the security message is critical. 
Nevertheless, individual characteristics and beliefs also play an important 
role in behaviour and must be taken into account. Similarly, the work by 
Forcht et al. (1988) proposes the use of information security awareness 
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techniques to create, promote and maintain a strong ethical foundation 
within an organisation and, thereby, promote information security issues. 
They also emphasise the importance of attitudes and the role of right and 
wrong within organisations. They explore ethical problems within IT 
environments. 
 
Instead of explicit security awareness training certain writers argue that the 
focus should rather be on ethical education in order to improve the security 
behaviour of employees. Ethical principles would then form the foundation of 
correct and incorrect behaviour. (Siponen, 2000b; Kluge, 1998). In this 
respect linkages between specific security acts and ethical principles would 
be forged and demonstrated and a climate of justifying security behaviour to 
be either morally acceptable or not would be brought about (Siponen, 
2000b). Kluge proposes the need for a code of ethics to be used to enlighten 
and guide personnel on security matters, and, thereby, encourage security 
behaviour - specifically in terms of the medical environment in which the 
need to protect patient information is critical. 
 
While conveying the security awareness message is considered to be 
important it is also critical to ensure that it is possible to measure the 
effectiveness of the security awareness initiatives (Kruger et al., 2006). As 
mentioned, however, more research is required on the link between security 
awareness initiatives and the outcomes of such initiatives – in other words 
the behaviour of employees within organisations as a result of these 
initiatives. Schultz (2004:1) calls for further research on the benefits of 
information security awareness and training. Srikwan and Jakobsson 
(2007:2) agree with this call and maintain that sufficient attention has not 
been paid to this aspect. They add that the main challenge is the fact that 
the problem is multidimensional – a combination of social and technical 
problems. 
 
It is necessary to ensure that the information security awareness initiatives 
are adequate, appropriate and effective. To this end Kruger et al. (2006) 
propose a framework for measuring the effectiveness of awareness initiatives 
while at the same time they suggest a way to determine those areas that 
need to be evaluated. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the security 
awareness initiatives should also identify possible areas of improvement 
(Hansche et al, 2004:69; Schlienger & Teufel, 2005).  
 
2.4.3.4 Extending and building on the work of Stanton et al. 
 
This research adopts the model proposed by Stanton et al (2005) in order to 
draw conclusions about whether awareness training does have an effect on 
specific behavioural categories. This model states that all security behaviour 
may be plotted on a behavioural continuum. On one level behaviour is 
categorised based on the intentions of the user – from malicious to neutral to 
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benevolent behaviour. On another level behaviour may be categorised based 
on the level of expertise of the user ranging from novice to expert and 
something in between the two. This approach produces a two-factor 
taxonomy of user security behaviours which yields six broad behavioural 
categories as illustrated in figure 3 below. This research focuses on those 
behaviours that require low technical expertise and it maps those behaviours 
against this model.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Two-factor taxonomy of end-user security behaviours (Adopted from Stanton et al. 
2005). 
 
The goal of this security awareness research is to move the intentions of 
employees towards the right-hand side of the chart.  In this way Stanton et 
al. (2005:132) provide a practical framework for categorising information 
security behaviours. This model now lays a foundation for the measurement 
of security behaviours. This research measures those behaviours which 
require low levels of expertise i.e. Detrimental Misuse, Naïve Mistakes and 
Basic Hygiene. 
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An illustrative example of the above taxonomy is presented in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Examples of behaviours that require low levels of expertise. 
 
Behaviour Intent Expertise 
Employee sends pornographic material 
to colleagues. 
Malicious Low 
Employee shares password with his 
wife. 
Neutral Low 
Employee chooses a strong password. Benevolent Low 
 
This research report measures end-user security behaviours in a formal 
manner in order to determine whether the awareness training to which 
individuals were exposed will make a difference to their future behaviour. 
Stanton et al. (2005:124, 131) used simple correlation to show that good 
password practices (changing passwords frequently and choosing strong 
passwords) were associated with training and awareness, knowledge on the 
part of employees that they were being monitored and organisational 
benefits as perceived by the employees. However a positive correlation does 
not necessarily mean that these good password practices were the result of 
training and awareness. 
 
Interestingly Stanton et al. (2005) did not find any correlation with another 
type of naïve security behaviour – that of sharing one’s password. They 
concluded that there is no evidence that password sharing behaviour is 
associated with training, awareness, organisational rewards and the 
knowledge of being monitored (Stanton et al., 2005).  
 
Additional research is needed in this area and is called for explicitly by 
Stanton et al. (2005). Different techniques are used in this research which 
yield different results to those obtained by Stanton et al. (2005). For 
example, Stanton et al. used surveys to gather their data whereas this 
research used direct observation. This research report contributes to the 
existing information security awareness literature and extends it. In other 
words, a portion of the model presented by Stanton et al. will be used to 
draw conclusions about whether awareness training had an effect on specific 
behavioural categories. 
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2.5 SUMMARY 
 
It was discussed in this chapter that there is a dearth of in-depth information 
security awareness research and that behavioural concepts are not properly 
taken into account in security awareness programmes. The information 
security awareness literature falls into one of three categories. Most of the 
literature is related to the importance and the techniques of security 
awareness. Then there is research on computer abuse and the threat of 
insider abuse. Finally, Behavioural Information Security is a relatively new 
field that examines the motivations behind security behaviours. Information 
security awareness research relating to: the influence of social psychology on 
security behaviour; the role of security culture and ethical considerations are 
grouped under behavioural information security.  
 
There is a lack of research on Behavioural Information Security and 
theoretical models which explain the way in which awareness training affects 
behaviour. Specifically, there is a shortage of research demonstrating the 
practical effectiveness of Information Security awareness training. Where 
studies do exist they focus mainly on the effectiveness of anti-phishing 
training. Secondly, aside from the research by Jagatic et al. (1997), no other 
studies were found that used direct observation in order to measure security 
behaviour.  This study builds on existing behavioural information security 
research, namely, the model proposed by Stanton et al (2005) in order to 
draw conclusions about whether awareness training has an effect on specific 
behavioural categories. A theoretical model, based on an organisational 
learning model, explains the way in which organisational learning takes 
place. This model shows that both explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge 
are needed.  
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CHAPTER 3 : MEASURING SECURITY 
BEHAVIOUR 
  
 
You should write the Methods chapter as a reasoned argument toward the conclusion 
that the questions can be answered (or hypotheses confirmed) … by analyzing data that 
can be collected from a viable sample. 
Jens Mende (2006) 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the shortcomings and limitations of the 
existing security awareness research. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present a detailed research strategy – in terms of sampling, data collection 
and data analysis – for achieving the objectives which were introduced in 
Chapter 1. The goal of this research perhaps merits being restated – to 
determine the effect of exposure to security awareness training on end-user 
behaviour. Three hypotheses were tested.  
 
The first hypothesis comprises a composite construct made up of three sub-
hypotheses. This hypothesis states that end-user exposure to security 
awareness training has an effect on three specific security behaviours – End-
user exposure to security awareness training on appropriate information 
handling improves the secure handling of information; End-user exposure to 
security awareness training on acceptable usage of e-mail and Internet 
facilities diminishes Internet and e-mail abuse on the part of end-users and, 
End-user exposure to security awareness training on password management 
best practices improves the secure handling of passwords by end-users. 
 
The second hypothesis proposes that end-user exposure to security 
awareness training increases the internalisation of security knowledge while 
the third hypothesis proposes that internalised security information is 
necessary in order for users to enact appropriate security behaviours. 
 
The research approaches adopted in this study are presented in table 3 
below. The previous two chapters used conceptual analysis in order to 
identify the existing information security awareness landscape, shortcomings 
in the existing material and possible areas of improvement. In terms of 
conceptual analysis the presence of an existing concept is examined, 
considered and categorised (Methods of Conceptual Analysis, 2008) including 
explaining the implications and inconsistencies of the concept (Welman & 
Kruger, 2001:24). 
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Table 3: Research methods used (Adopted from Puhakainen, 2007) 
 
Research Step Chapters Research 
Approach/Strategy 
Introduction and 
literature survey  
1 & 2 Conceptual analysis 
Research methods and 
results 
3 Action research and case 
study 
 
 
This research also used action research as the preferred research method. In 
terms of action research the problem is identified, a plan of action with which 
to address the problem is developed and implemented, and the data is 
collected and evaluated. The actual implications of the findings are then 
discussed (Baskerville, 1999). Action research is suitable for examining 
information systems methods in a practical setting and studying the 
appropriateness of the research in real-life (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 
1996). 
 
Puhakainen maintains that action research is an empirical method and a form 
of research in terms of which the researcher becomes involved in solving the 
actual, practical problems experienced by an organisation (Puhakainen, 
2006:11).  
 
It therefore follows that a case study would be chosen as the appropriate 
strategy for this research as this approach corresponds with action research 
in the sense that the question under examination arises in the case study in 
question. The case study approach was also beneficial because this research 
was coupled with the existing information security awareness activities within 
the organisation. 
 
Therefore the coupling of the planned security awareness activities with this 
research provided a dual benefit – it provided data for the research while it 
also provided security awareness training to employees on the Acceptable 
Usage Policy (AUP) of the organisation. This research also measures the 
effectiveness of such training in the organisation. In this sense the 
organisation in question is able to make a decision on whether the approach 
to awareness training was successful or not and whether the organisation 
should continue with the same strategy in the future or adopt a different 
approach. The researcher of this report played an active role by executing 
the security awareness activities at the organisation as well as gathering the 
data that is the subject of this report.  
 
The organisation that was the subject of the case study is a South-African 
based company that operates in various countries. The headquarters of the 
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organisation are in South Africa and it has a staff complement of 5 726 
employees. Although the approval of the organisation was obtained prior to 
carrying out the research within the organisation the company will remain 
anonymous in this report. As with all organisations, the organisation in 
question, which henceforth will be termed Topaz CC, was concerned about 
security within the organisation. This is especially true in terms of the 
protection of customer information that the organisation stores and 
processes. The protection of such information (as in the case of other 
information) is mandated by South African law. 
 
Topaz CC has fairly recently both approved and promulgated a number of 
information security policies. One of the most important of these policies is 
the AUP (Acceptable Usage Policy). The AUP (see Appendix A) comprises a 
single document that covers all end-user responsibilities including all 
employees or third-parties accessing Topaz CC’s network (for example, 
consultants and suppliers). This organisation, in common with many others, 
has experienced a number of incidents and blatant violations of its AUP by 
employees. Therefore the first step was to ensure that users were aware of 
their security responsibilities and the actions that they should take in order to 
become more secure. In the past security awareness activities at Topaz CC 
had been scanty and haphazard and had consisted of occasional emails sent 
to all employees on certain topics such as clean desk policy, correct email 
usage and emails regarding the threat of viruses and phishing scams. Emails 
had been used as they were considered the most efficient method of 
communicating with all users. Consequently, email was used for all end-user 
communication and the end-users had been bombarded by emails on a daily 
basis. The existing AUP had been completed in 2006 and included a user 
friendly security guideline booklet. The AUP consists of various sections on 
end-user responsibilities such as software usage, email usage and mobile 
computing. For each section the guidelines booklet illustrates a scenario 
using cartoon strips in order to render the message more acceptable to the 
users. The booklet was distributed to end-users during 2006.  During 2007 
various security emails were sent to end-users on specific topics contained 
within the AUP every two months. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
 
The following diagram depicts the sequence of activities which were followed 
during this research. This information is presented in order to provide the 
reader with a perspective on the nature of the research. Thereafter, a more 
detailed discussion on the techniques followed will be presented. 
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Initially, three security behaviours on the part of the control and the 
experimental group members were measured. These behaviours were 
categorised as Detrimental Misuse, Naïve Mistakes and Basic Hygiene. The 
measurements were entered on the security behaviour scorecards of each of 
the control group and experimental group members (A). Thereafter the 
members of the experimental group were exposed to the security awareness 
training film (delivered in three separate parts) and the accompanying 
security test (B). The control group members were not exposed to the 
training but were required merely to complete the security test (C).  
 
The security behaviours of the control and the experimental group members 
were again measured, collated and entered on the security behaviour 
scorecards (D). Thereafter the security behaviour scorecards were used as 
input to test the validity of the hypotheses proposed in this report by using 
the statistical techniques described in this chapter (E). 
3.2.2  Statistical techniques employed 
 
In most cases non-parametric statistical techniques have been used. The 
reason for this is the different sample sizes which were obtained from the 
Behaviour 
scorecard 
 
Hypothesis 
testing 
 
B 
A 
C 
E 
D 
Detrimental Misuse 
 
Naïve Mistakes 
 
Basic Hygiene 
 
Control Group 
 
Experimental Group 
 
Figure 2. High-level overview of research approach 
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control and the experimental groups. In addition, some of the experimental 
group sample sizes were much smaller than the control group sizes. There 
was thus some concern about the normality of the data. The reason for this 
difference in the sample sizes is to be found in the fact that the control group 
members merely had to complete the necessary security tests whereas the 
experimental groups had to watch a security film and then complete the 
security test. Thus, the experimental group members may have found the 
process too onerous. In cases where parametric tests have been used the 
data meets the general assumptions for parametric tests, namely, the 
samples are random and the observations are independent (Pallant, 
2001:255,256). 
 
3.2.3  Security behaviour measurement strategy 
 
In order to test the three sub-hypotheses for hypothesis one the extent to 
which the security behaviour complies with the AUP must be measured since 
the AUP specifies what comprises acceptable and unacceptable security 
behaviour. The AUP for Topaz CC is a relatively lengthy document for a 
layperson to read and it consists of nine security sections or topics. Within 
these nine security topics multiple policy statements will apply depending on 
the specific topic. For example, the section on email usage consists of 
directives on the primary use of email, automatic forwarding of email, the 
use of webmail accounts, prohibited email activities etc.  
 
Accordingly, there are many potential security policy statements that could 
be measured for compliance. However, a subset of these policy statements 
only was measured. The decision regarding the measurement of those 
policies with which end-users comply is based on Stanton’s taxonomy of 
security behaviours. The strategy of this research is to use the taxonomy of 
behaviours developed by Stanton et al. (2005) as a foundation for classifying 
the behaviours to be measured. The choice was made to measure those 
behaviours that require a low level of technical expertise. These behaviours 
must, of course, also appear in Topaz CC’s organisational policy so that it is 
possible to measure compliance with the organisation’s security policy. 
 
Table 4 below maps the actual AUP statements to the hypothesis to be tested 
and explains the rationale for choosing a particular policy statement to be 
measured and why each particular policy statement reflects the hypothesis in 
question. This demonstrates that measuring the hypotheses also measures 
compliance to portions of the organisation’s AUP. If the behaviour can be 
mapped to a policy then we can make conclusions about the security of an 
organisation (based on compliance to the policy). This method is something 
that security practitioners could find useful for their organisations. 
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Table 4: AUP sections to be measured mapped to research hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis to be 
tested 
Intent  Skill Policy statement in  
Acceptable Usage 
Policy 
Rationale 
H1a: End-user 
exposure to 
security 
awareness 
training on 
appropriate 
information 
handling improves 
secure handling of 
information. 
 
Behaviour 
category: Naïve 
mistakes 
Neutral Low “Your user ID and 
password are the 
key defences for the 
organisation’s 
equipment, systems 
and information.  In 
order to protect 
these, you are 
expected… not to 
share your password 
with anyone, 
including IT support 
staff…” 
 
It is argued that your password is 
one of the most sensitive pieces of 
data available since is it the key to 
your information and must be 
handled with great care. It does 
not require high technical 
expertise to share your password 
with other individuals but it does 
require users to be cautious. 
Intentionality rating is considered 
neutral if the password is given 
away carelessly. 
H1b: End-user 
exposure to 
security 
awareness 
training on 
acceptable usage 
of e-mail and 
Internet facilities 
diminishes 
Internet and e-
mail abuse on the 
part of end-users. 
 
Behaviour 
category: 
Detrimental 
misuse 
Negative Low “Occasional personal 
use of the Internet 
is permitted at the 
discretion of your 
manager… Follow 
the corporate 
principles regarding 
resource usage and 
exercise good 
judgement when 
using the Internet” 
Abuse of Internet facilities is 
considered behaviour with a 
malicious intent since 
organisational resources are being 
abused. The organisation is also 
placed at risk if users download 
spyware (deliberately or 
inadvertently) when using Internet 
facilities. Indirectly, the 
organisation is affected since the 
user spends more time on the 
Internet than working.  It, 
therefore, follows that the greater 
the abuse of Internet facilities the 
more detrimental this is to the 
organisation.  
H1c: End-user 
exposure to 
security 
awareness 
training on 
password 
management best 
practices 
improves secure 
handling of 
passwords by 
end-users. 
 
Behaviour 
category:Basic 
hygiene 
Positive Low “..you are 
expected…to use 
well chosen 
passwords...   
ensure that consists 
of mixed case, 
numerical characters 
and special 
characters and avoid 
the use of personal 
information and 
dictionary words in 
the password.” 
The focus of this policy is on 
choosing passwords that are 
difficult for attackers to guess yet 
easy for the owners to remember. 
This is considered positive or 
beneficial intention as users are 
consciously choosing strong 
passwords and thereby ensuring 
their user account is more secure. 
Technical expertise is not required 
in order to choose a strong 
password. 
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These policy statements are corroborated by studies carried out by Stanton & 
Stam (2006:313-314) in which they requested a group of security experts to 
categorise a list of 93 behaviours in terms of intentionality (positive, negative 
or neutral), and in terms of the expertise needed to execute that behaviour 
(lower, middle and high). Discussions with a security expert in South Africa 
also confirmed that measuring the policy statements above would be 
appropriate in terms of testing the corresponding hypothesis. So, for 
example, in terms of Hypothesis 1a, in testing the impact of training on the 
secure handling of information the policy statement prohibiting sharing of 
passwords was tested. Secondly, in terms of Hypothesis 1b in testing the 
impact of Internet usage training on end-users the policy statement on the 
correct and incorrect use of the Internet was tested. Likewise, in terms of 
hypothesis 1c, in testing the impact of training on the usage of passwords by 
end-users the policy statement requiring a specific composition of passwords 
was tested.  
 
 
3.2.3.1 Sampling 
 
Both control and experimental groups were used for the research design. The 
reason for this is that the use of a control group is considered the most 
practical way in which to control nuisance variables. Therefore, the 
behavioural measurements described in this chapter were measured for both 
the control and the experimental group members. The candidates for both 
were employees of the organisation. Thus, the population (N) was 5,726. The 
organisation consists of a number of distinct strata based on the 
organisational departments each of different sizes, cultures, and priorities. In 
addition, as a result of the nature of the organisation, there are a large 
number of contractors working in the organisation. Different cultures exist, 
for example; consider the differences between field engineers as opposed to 
call centre personnel. The nature of the research demanded that the sample 
size be as large as possible.  
 
The criterion for choosing the groups was that all candidate members had to 
have Internet access. This was important since two of the behavioural 
measurements for testing hypotheses 1a and 1b (Naïve Mistakes and 
Detrimental Misuse) measure end-user susceptibility to a phishing mail and 
Internet browse times. Thus, a list of all end-users who had Internet access 
was generated. This amounted to 8 600 entries and included system 
accounts as well as end-user accounts.  
 
Many targets were removed from the sample as they were considered 
invalid. For example, there were no browse times available for the end-user, 
and certain entries were system accounts or IP addresses. Some employees 
who had joined the organisation very recently as part of a company 
acquisition were also excluded.  Finally, executive accounts and persons 
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associated with executives in some way were removed as the researcher 
wanted to ensure that the end-users were not interfered with in any way 
during the fieldwork. The final, viable sample size (n) totalled 2,144. 
Thereafter the list of end-users was divided into control and experimental 
groups as follows. A random number (between 1 and 10000) was generated 
and assigned to each end-user in the sample. The RANDBETWEEN Microsoft 
Excel function was used to generate these random numbers. The list of end-
user was then sorted by their assigned random number from smallest to 
largest. The first half of the list (1,072) was allocated to the control group 
and the second 1,072 entries were allocated to the experimental group. 
 
3.2.3.2 Data collection 
 
 
Once the policy statements to be measured had been agreed upon the next 
step was to select the most appropriate mechanism with which to measure 
these policy statements.  Table 5 below illustrates the variables required in 
order to measure these policy statements. 
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Table 5: Hypothesis 1 mapped to variables 
 
Hypothesis Description Indep. 
variable 
Dependent Variable 
Measurement  
Analysis Dependent Variable Score 
Calculation 
H1a: Naive Mistakes 
(Neutral Intent): End-user 
exposure to security 
awareness training on 
appropriate information 
handling improves secure 
handling of information. 
Binary: 
Viewed 
security 
awareness 
film (Y or 
N) 
A binary variable was used. 
The mechanism employed 
comprised a (harmless) 
doubtful email sent from a 
fictitious email address to 
the sample, but purporting 
to come from Topaz CC. 
The email requested users 
to update their information 
on file by clicking on the 
link provided. 
Chi-
Square 
Should end-users click on the link 
in the email a value of (“Y”) is 
assigned to the person’s user ID. 
Otherwise a value of (“N”) is 
assigned to the person’s User ID. 
H1b: Detrimental Misuse 
(Malicious Intent): End-user 
exposure to security 
awareness training on 
acceptable usage of e-mail 
and Internet facilities 
diminishes Internet and e-
mail abuse on part of end-
users. 
Binary: 
Viewed 
security 
awareness 
film (Y or 
N) – 
Binary 
A continuous variable was 
used. Internet browse time 
activity (in minutes) over a 
two week period was 
measured.  
Indepen
dent-
samples 
t test 
Raw browse times in minutes were 
used. These were obtained from the 
corporate web monitoring tool – 
SurfControl. 
H1c: Basic hygiene 
(Beneficial Intent): End-
user exposure to security 
awareness training on 
password management best 
practices improves secure 
handling of passwords by 
end-users. 
 
Binary: 
Viewed 
security 
awareness 
film (Y or 
N) - Binary 
 
 
 
A binary variable was used. 
Password hashes for 
sample users were 
extracted and run through 
a freely available password 
cracker in an attempt to 
identify weak passwords. 
Chi-
Square 
Users with passwords that could be 
cracked, received a value of “Y” 
otherwise a value of “N” was 
assigned.  
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In terms of the Naïve Mistakes behaviour measurement (H1a) an email was 
devised to be sent to both the control and the experimental group members. 
The purpose was to determine whether end-users would be duped by an 
email that looked as if it had come from Topaz CC. The email requested the 
users to update their details by clicking on a link provided. In actual phishing 
cases once an end-user is taken in by an email and clicks on the link they are 
likely to enter their credentials into the fake website to which they have been 
directed. In this way criminals are able to “phish” passwords. Thus if a user 
clicks on the link provided in this exercise it is assumed he/she would provide 
his/her credentials if prompted to do so. Care was taken to ensure that the 
email did not look completely authentic as it was felt that this would have 
been unfair to end-users. The email contained a number of clues that should 
have raised the alarm for vigilant end-users. For example, although the 
name of the sender appears to be legitimate (“Team TOPAZ CC”) the actual 
email address has another domain name.  On the other hand, care was taken 
not to make the email too obvious. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Actual email that respondents received. 
 
The system was designed in such a way that once users had clicked on a link 
their user ID was registered on a central database located on the Internet. 
The end-users were not directed to a website nor were they prompted for 
their credentials. 
 
In terms of the Detrimental Misuse behaviour measurement (H1b) the design 
comprised the use of standard reports from Topaz CC’s corporate web 
monitoring tool – SurfControl. Reports were generated for both the control 
and the experimental group members. These reports indicated their browse 
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times in minutes over a two week period. 
 
In terms of Basic Hygiene behaviour measurement (H1c) the design required 
that the passwords used by both the control and the experimental group 
members were tested for strength. The design involved the use a freely 
available password cracker termed John the Ripper (also known as John). 
John contains various options for cracking passwords, but, in the end, it was 
decided to use the wordlist option with word mangling enabled. This meant 
that John would compare user passwords to words and phrases found in a 
wordlist. In this case a 42MB wordlist containing the most common and also 
not so common passwords and passphrases was used. The word mangling 
feature was also used. This creates numerous variations of each 
password/passphrase found in the wordlist. Therefore, running John in this 
mode generates a vast number of possible passwords and passphrases which 
are compared with the user passwords which have been extracted. In this 
way common and weak passwords are easily and quickly identified. 
 
The three security behaviours described above were designed to be 
measured twice: once prior to security awareness training and once 
subsequent to security awareness training. Obviously the control group did 
not undergo security awareness training. This process is depicted in table 6 
below. 
 
 
Table 6: Research design 
Group Measure 3 Security 
Behaviour 
Indicators 
Provide Security 
Awareness Training 
Measure 3 Security 
Behaviour 
Indicators 
Control Group    
Experimental 
Group 
   
 
 
Once all these variables had been successfully collected a security behaviour 
scorecard was created for each control and each experimental group 
member. A sample score card is depicted in figure 4 below. 
 
3.2.3.3 Data analysis 
 
Figure 3 below is a screenshot of a populated security behaviour scorecard 
once the data described above has been collected. 
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Figure 4: Security scorecard 
 
 
The research design allows various relationships to be measured. In terms of 
hypothesis 1a and 1c the differences are measured between the control and 
the experimental groups using a chi-square test. Thus differences will be 
observed for Naïve Mistakes and Basic Hygiene. 
 
3.2.4 The effect of the information security awareness strategy 
 
The security awareness material consisted of a professionally commissioned 
security awareness film for which a script was written. This script was based 
on Topaz CC’s AUP and the existing security guideline booklet. The script was 
then performed by professional actors and filmed at Topaz CC’s premises so 
that end-users would be able to relate to the environment when viewing the 
film. The actual film was created in three parts each of which contained a 
specific theme for the end-users. The theme for part one of the film was 
Passwords, Clean Desk and Information Handling, part two of the film was on 
Malicious Code, Virus Protection and Software Use Part three of the film 
depicted Mobile computing, Internet and e-mail use, storage use and 
inappropriate content. The method chosen to screen the film to the users 
was by means of streaming video coupled to a competition.  
 
In order to test hypothesis 2 – End-user exposure to security awareness 
training increases the internalisation of security knowledge – it was 
necessary that the end-users’ understanding of the security material (three-
part security awareness film) be tested by way of a security test. Accordingly 
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the training material was designed in the following way:  
 
1. A competition was announced to both the control and the experimental 
group members. 
2. The competition was divided into three parts and it ran over a number 
of weeks. In order to stand a chance of winning, each participant had 
to participate in each section of the competition. 
3. The experimental group members were requested to watch each part 
of the film and they were then asked a series of questions that would 
both test their comprehension (knowledge questions) and gauge their 
opinion on the value of the film.  
4. The control group was not exposed to the three parts of the film and 
they were merely directed to the three sets of questions to test their 
comprehension. 
5. After the third and final part of the competition had been deployed the 
winner of the competition was announced. 
 
  
The training material was designed to use techniques borrowed from learning 
science and related disciplines to ensure that that it was as effective as 
possible. As was discussed in the previous chapter previous researchers have 
also found the use of a film in a training environment to be an effective tool 
in rendering the message more appealing to audiences (Mitnick & Simon, 
2002:250; Hansche et al., 2004:68).  In addition, the training material and 
its implementation were compatible with the properties of a successful 
security awareness campaign.  
 
Hansche et al. (2004:71), for example, argue that, for any awareness 
programme, the awareness messages should, inter alia, be simple and 
straightforward, and be positive and motivational. It should entertain the 
audience, be humorous where appropriate, convey to the audience what the 
threats comprise and what their responsibilities are and reiterate the most 
important messages. To this end the awareness film deployed in this 
research meets and even exceeds these requirements. The film was written 
to be entertaining and to create an absorbing story by depicting humorous 
scenarios and even perhaps extreme situations. Key messages were repeated 
by the actors and subtitles were included during important events in the 
story. Actors were portrayed in difficult scenarios often faced by employees 
at Topaz CC. Initially the actors were shown performing inappropriate 
behaviour and the risks of such forms of behaviour were explained. 
Thereafter the appropriate behaviours were depicted by the actors thus 
portraying to the audience the behaviour that is expected of them. Thus the 
film provided context as well as the necessary content required. 
 
Acclimation is one condition that afflicts certain awareness campaigns and it 
is a condition that must be avoided at all costs. In terms of acclimation a 
stimulus which is designed to be an attention getter is used repeatedly with 
the result that the learner will selectively ignore the stimulus. For the 
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purpose of this research it is unlikely that such a situation arose since the 
research participants were exposed to the specific security awareness 
material only once. However, in the long-term, organisations using 
awareness techniques are challenged to devise something new and 
innovative in order to capture and to hold the attention of the  participants. 
 
Finally, as was previously mentioned, both the control group and the 
experimental group members had to complete three security tests which 
were designed to measure their understanding of the AUP. Thus, the first test 
assessed the understanding of password usage and information handling. 
Accordingly a high score for this test would mean that the participants had a 
good understanding of what is required in terms of information handling and 
password usage from a policy point of view. The second test assessed the 
participants’ understanding of malicious code and software usage policy. 
The third test assessed the end-users’ understanding of Internet and Email 
usage policy. 
 
Table 7: Hypothesis 2 mapped to variables 
Hypothesis 
Description 
Indep. 
variable 
Dependent Variable 
Measurement  
Analysis Dependent 
Variable Score 
Calculation 
H2: End-user 
exposure to security 
awareness training 
increases the 
internalisation of 
security knowledge 
 
Binary: 
Viewed 
security 
awareness 
film (Y or 
N) 
A numerical variable 
was used. Control and 
experimental group 
members were 
required to answer a 
set of questions after 
each part of the film. 
Independent
-samples t 
test and 
Mann-
Whitney 
test. 
Multiple choice 
questions were 
presented. Each 
correct answer 
was awarded a 
score of 1. Each 
incorrect score 
was awarded a 
value of zero. 
Scores for each 
part of the survey 
part were tallied in 
order to obtain 3 
scores for each 
end-user. 
 
 
In terms of hypothesis 2 once again a difference was sought between the 
scores of the control and the experimental groups for each of the tests using 
an independent-samples t test and a Mann-Whitney test where appropriate. 
Since both the control and the experimental group members each completed 
three separate tests these test scores were compared to ascertain whether 
there were any significant differences between the control and the 
experimental groups. An overall difference between the control and the 
experimental groups was expected, namely, that the control group scores 
would be lower than the scores of the experimental group since the 
experimental group had undergone training. 
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In terms of hypothesis 3 a test was carried out to determine whether there 
was a significant difference between the mean test scores of the 
experimental group members and their associated behaviours after training. 
For example, after training would those experimental group members who 
had committed Naïve Mistakes score worse on their tests or vice versa. 
Likewise was there a correlation between the scores obtained by 
experimental group members and their subsequent Internet browse times? 
One would expect there to be a strong correlation between high scores (for 
control and experimental groups) and Internet browse times. This would then 
have supported the hypothesis which is depicted in table 8 below. 
 
 
Table 8: Hypothesis 3 mapped to variables 
Hypothesis 
Description 
Indep. 
variable 
Dependent Variable 
Measurement  
Analysis Dependent 
Variable Score 
Calculation 
H3: Internalised 
security information 
is necessary for 
users to enact 
appropriate security 
behaviours. 
 
Test 
scores for 
each of the 
three tests 
under-
taken by 
users. 
See dependent 
variable measurement 
for H1a, H1b and H1c 
above. 
Independent
-samples t 
test, 
Spearman 
Rank Order 
Correlation. 
See dependent 
variable 
calculation for 
H1a, H1b and H1c 
above. 
 
 
3.3 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presents a detailed research strategy which illustrates the way 
in which this research was carried out in order to achieve those objectives 
which were introduced in chapter 1, namely, to determine the impact of 
information security awareness training on information security behaviour. 
The approach was divided into two strategies. The first strategy concerned 
hypothesis one and portrayed the way in which the variables in this 
hypothesis were operationalised using system-generated data. The strategy 
was depicted in terms of sampling, data collection and data analysis 
activities. A subset of behaviours (based on a typical Acceptable Usage 
Policy) that require low technical expertise on the part of the end-user only 
were considered to be in scope. The second strategy covered hypotheses two 
and three and focused on the awareness material and the way in which this 
material was designed, deployed and measured in terms of sampling, data 
collection and data analysis.  
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 : PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
AND INTERPRETATION 
 
  
 
We are not in the business of protecting information. We only protect information in so 
far as it supports the business needs and requirements of our company 
 
 Senior Security Manager at a major electric utility (GAO, 1998:21) 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the statistical 
techniques which were employed in respect of the hypotheses, the research 
problem which was introduced in chapter 1 and the literature survey which 
was presented in chapter 2. Thus the meaning and implications of these 
statistical techniques will be explained in light of the objectives of this 
research and will take into account the theoretical model proposed by this 
research report. 
 
4.1. PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
 
Essentially two pilot studies were carried out before the deployment of the 
security awareness training at Topaz CC. A “pre-pilot” test was carried out on 
the 29 November 2007. It was deployed to employees of the organisation in 
order to gauge their response to the awareness material. The pre-pilot test 
comprised the screening of the first part of the security awareness film in an 
auditorium to a captive audience of 53 individuals during their induction 
training. This pre-pilot test lasted 25 minutes – 15 minutes to view the film 
and 10 minutes during which questions were fielded and the audience 
completed the questionnaire.  Four simple questions were posed to the 
audience. Two of the questions were in respect of their perception of the 
awareness movie while the other two comprised knowledge questions to test 
the comprehension of the material in the film. Overall the responses were 
positive: 
 
• 51 individuals responded (returned the questionnaire) – 96.2% 
• 100% of the audience agreed that the film had provided clarity in 
respect of what is expected of them in terms of security 
• 98% of the audience (50 responses) responded that they learnt 
something new from viewing the film 
• No negative comments were received except one to the effect that the 
questionnaire could have been more simple 
• Knowledge question 1: 92% answered correctly 
• Knowledge question 2: 94% answered correctly 
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The purpose of the pre-pilot study was to obtain a response to the film and 
to ensure that the message in the film was comprehensible to the members 
of the audience.  
 
The actual pilot study commenced on 28 May 2008 and ended on 13 June 
2008. This study consisted of showing the three part security awareness film 
and then administering the accompanying security test to 17 individuals 
within the organisation. In order to obtain a broad spectrum of opinions for 
the pilot study the individuals selected were not members of the same 
department. They were requested to watch the film and to answer the 
accompanying questions. They were specifically instructed to highlight any 
questions that were ambiguous or which were open to misunderstanding. Ten 
individuals responded to this request. All of the respondents were of the 
opinion that the questions were clear and to the point and, apart from a few 
grammatical changes, the actual research design did not materially change. 
It was decided to deploy the awareness material in its present form. 
 
 
As mentioned previously the sample was based on those users who had 
Internet access. The control group and the experimental group were split 
evenly with 1,072 of the sample in the control group and the other half in the 
experimental group. Within the organisation there are 3 divisions that are 
considered to be technical divisions. In other words, these divisions are 
focused on the developing, managing and maintaining of the IT systems for 
Topaz CC. Therefore employees in the organisation who are members these 
divisions are considered “technical” as opposed to “non-technical”. For 
example, a system administrator in the IS division in the IT department is 
considered to be technical, whereas a financial controller in the finance 
division is considered as non-technical. The split of end-users in the sample 
is presented in figure 5 below – 30% (639) of end-users are considered 
technical whereas 70% (1,505) are considered non-technical.   
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Figure 5: Technical vs. Non-technical split within sample 
 
 
The entire sample consisted of users within the South African operations 
which are geographically dispersed across the country. Job types varied 
across divisions and ranged from senior managers to call-centre agents and 
system administrators. Employees within the sample also enjoyed different 
types of employment relationships with Topaz CC:  
 
 
Table 9: Employment types within the sample showing permanent vs. non-permanent split 
Employee category Count (%) 
 
Permanent employee 
 
1557 (73%) 
 
Non-permanent employee (includes: contractors, 
temporary workers, consultants and outsourced 
employees) 
    
  587 (27%) 
Total 2144 (100%) 
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4.2.  RESULTS OF SECURITY BEHAVIOUR MEASUREMENT 
STRATEGY 
 
4.2.1. Sampling 
 
4.2.1.1. Naïve Mistakes 
 
In terms of Naïve Mistakes (H1a) the phishing email which had been devised 
was sent to the entire sample of 2,144 end-user email addresses prior to the 
end-users undergoing training. The phishing email was sent on Saturday, 26 
July 2008. The last response to the phishing email was received on 30 July 
2008 at 20:00. One of the participants interfered with the study and 
attempted to poison the results by sending fabricated data to the server 
which was collating the information. The worst case scenario was assumed 
and 6 responses were discarded from the list of responses. Therefore, the 
response rate totalled 1,138 hits or 53% of the sample.   
 
In terms of the post-security awareness deployment the same phishing email 
was sent to the same sample as before on Monday, 8 September 2008. The 
last response to the phishing email was received on 20 October 2008. The 
response rate was 1,004 hits or 47%. In order to place this response rate in 
perspective Jagatic et al. (2007) carried out context-aware phishing tests and 
obtained a hit rate of 74%. 
 
Security test 1 measured Naïve Mistakes and, therefore, only those 
experimental members who had completed part 1 of the training and the 
security test were taken into account. A total of 57 experimental group 
members responded to the 1st part of the training while 221 control group 
members responded to the 1st survey. This amounts to a response rate of 
5% and 20% respectively. Consequently, this was the final sample size used 
in the statistical analysis. 
 
4.2.1.2. Detrimental Misuse 
 
The SurfControl web filtering tool was used to gather Internet browse times 
for both the control and the experimental group members. Two extracts were 
taken – one before and one after the security awareness intervention. The 
first extract was generated on 15 July 2008 for the period 1 July 2008–15 
July 2008 while the second extract was generated on 22 September 2008 for 
the period 8 September 2008 – 22 September 2008.  
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In terms of the pre-security awareness extract 2 070 records were obtained 
– a 97% response rate while for the post-security awareness extract 1,710 
records of the sample groups were obtained.  
4.2.1.3. Basic Hygiene 
 
As a result of the fact that Windows Active Directory (AD) passwords has the 
greatest coverage of users this application was chosen as the end-user 
passwords to be tested for password strength. The password hashes were 
extracted on 27 June 2008 for purposes of the pre-security awareness test. 
 
In total 20,447 password hashes were extracted from AD. The vast majority 
of these hashes were system accounts and other irrelevant accounts that 
were subsequently discarded. Of the 2,144 passwords in scope, 1,180 
passwords hashes were either partially cracked or not cracked at all. 
Therefore a total of 964 passwords were fully cracked. A further 42 user 
accounts had a “NO PASSWORD” in the password hash field which signifies a 
problem with the password hashes at the time of the data gathering. The 
latter had to be discounted with the result that the final list of passwords that 
could be fully cracked totalled 922 passwords – 43% of the control and 
experimental group passwords. 
 
 
Password cracking after the security awareness intervention took place in the 
following way. The password hashes were extracted and cracked on 20 
September 2008. The passwords were cracked as before using the same 
level of processing power and the same rule set Of the 2,144 passwords in 
scope 1,762 passwords where either partially cracked or not cracked at all. 
Therefore the remaining passwords that were fully cracked totalled 382 
passwords. A further 48 user accounts had “NO PASSWORD” in the password 
hash field which signifies that there was a problem with the password hashes 
at the time of the data gathering. The latter has to be discounted with the 
result that the final list of passwords that could be fully cracked totalled 334 
passwords – 16% of all the control and experimental groups. This represents 
a 27% improvement in the strength of passwords overall. 
 
4.2.2. Data collection 
 
4.2.2.1. Naïve Mistakes 
 
As mentioned above, in order to test Naïve Mistakes, a phishing email was 
sent to the sample, n, both before and after the security awareness training 
intervention to determine whether the awareness intervention had made a 
difference. The method used to gather the data was simple. Each sample 
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member received the email in his/her inbox. The email contained a hyperlink 
that, when clicked, would establish a connection to a server on the Internet 
and register that particular email address. A log of all those users who 
clicked on the link successfully (“hit list”) was then extracted and matched 
against the list in the sample (targets). If the user had clicked on the link a 
“Y” was inserted in the phishing column, otherwise an “N” was inserted in the 
phishing column of the security behaviour scorecard. The researcher double 
checked to ensure that those users with “Y” against their names were 
members of the “hit list” and that those with an “N” against their names were 
not on the “hit list” – this was done by carrying out random spot checks. In 
terms of the post security awareness training phishing email the design was 
changed slightly to avoid the attempted sample poisoning that had occurred 
in the first round. For this round hashes were used to prevent a rogue 
respondent from generating false responses. 
 
The data gathered for Naïve Mistakes were populated in the security 
behaviour scorecard of each sample member for further analysis. 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Detrimental Misuse 
 
SurfControl is a commercially available software tool that Topaz CC had 
purchased and which had been in operation in the organisation for a period 
of three years. It is installed on the organisation’s proxy server and, 
therefore, it monitors all Internet (and Intranet) bound traffic. All internal 
workstations requesting Internet connections are forced to connect via this 
proxy. Thus all Internet traffic is logged by SurfControl. SurfControl’s 
standard reports, such as the top ten sites visited and the top ten users by 
browse time have, in the past, been used by the organisation. The browse 
times for the purposes of this research were generated and displayed as total 
minutes for the period in question (2 weeks) per user. 
 
The following screenshot represents the SurfControl reporting interface which 
was used to generate a “Top N Users by Browse Time” report.  
 
 
 66 
 
 
Figure 6: SurfControl reporting interface 
 
4.2.2.3. Basic Hygiene 
 
Two steps were followed in the collection of the data. First a tool known as 
pwdump3e was used to extract password hashes from Active Directory. Once 
this had been completed the password hashes were subjected to a password 
cracking exercise to find out whether they appeared in a wordlist (or 
represented a variation of an entry in the wordlist). As mentioned, the 
password cracker used is termed John the Ripper (John). The crack ran for 3 
minutes with a dictionary list of 43 MBs with the word mangling option 
enabled. The hardware used comprised a standard laptop with 2GB of RAM 
and a 2Ghz Intel Core Duo CPU. The options selected – wordlist and 
mangling – simply mean that all the words and common phrases that appear 
in the wordlist are compared against the extracted password hashes to 
determine whether there is a match. If there is match the program, John, will 
display the discovered password alongside the extracted username. With 
word mangling enabled variations of the words and phrases in the wordlist 
are generated and compared with the extracted password hashes.  
 
If John is able to find a partial password then it will display letters in the 
password that it could find and the ones that it could not find will be 
indicated by a “?”. Therefore, assuming that John is attempting to crack the 
password – AdidasG254$ – and that it is able to find the first 6 letters only 
then the following would be displayed: Adidas?????. This would then be 
considered an uncracked password.  
 
All passwords that were fully cracked were designated by a “Y” next to the 
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relevant user name on the security behaviour scorecard and an “N” if not 
fully cracked. 
 
 
4.2.3. Data analysis 
 
In view of the fact that the intention was to explore the relationship between 
two categorical variables a Chi-Square test for independence was used for 
Naïve Mistakes and Basic Hygiene. For Detrimental Misuse an independent-
samples t test was used. 
4.2.3.1. Naïve Mistakes 
 
The sample consisted of an experimental group of 57 end-users and a control 
group of 221 end-users. As illustrated in table 10 below, prior to the training 
intervention, 67% of the control group members were non-compliant (taken 
in by a phishing attack) as opposed to 59.6% of the experimental group 
members. 
 
Table 10: Summary of Naïve Mistakes results before training for control vs. experimental groups 
C_E * Phishing_b Crosstabulation
73 148 221
76.3 144.7 221.0
33.0% 67.0% 100.0%
76.0% 81.3% 79.5%
26.3% 53.2% 79.5%
23 34 57
19.7 37.3 57.0
40.4% 59.6% 100.0%
24.0% 18.7% 20.5%
8.3% 12.2% 20.5%
96 182 278
96.0 182.0 278.0
34.5% 65.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
34.5% 65.5% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_b
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_b
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_b
% of Total
C
E
C_E
Total
N Y
Phishing_b
Total
 
 
 
As shown in table 11 below chi-square indicates that there is no significant 
difference between the percentage of non-compliant members in the control 
group and the percentage in the experimental group. The continuity 
correction value is .774 with an associated significance level of .379 which is 
> .05. 
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Table 11: Chi-Square test results for Naive Mistakes before training 
Chi-Square Tests
1.074b 1 .300
.774 1 .379
1.055 1 .304
.349 .189
278
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.
68.
b. 
 
 
The results of both the control group members and the experimental group 
members after the training show that there was an improvement in the 
behaviour towards the phishing email (Naïve Mistakes) in both groups. The 
more marked improvement was noted within the control group segment with 
53.4% non-compliant (down from 67%) while 57.9% of the experimental 
group members were non-compliant (down from 59.6%). The results are 
presented in table 12. 
 
Table 12: Summary of Naïve Mistakes results after training for control vs. experimental groups 
C_E * Phishing_a Crosstabulation
103 118 221
101.0 120.0 221.0
46.6% 53.4% 100.0%
81.1% 78.1% 79.5%
37.1% 42.4% 79.5%
24 33 57
26.0 31.0 57.0
42.1% 57.9% 100.0%
18.9% 21.9% 20.5%
8.6% 11.9% 20.5%
127 151 278
127.0 151.0 278.0
45.7% 54.3% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
45.7% 54.3% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_a
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_a
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Phishing_a
% of Total
C
E
C_E
Total
N Y
Phishing_a
Total
 
 
 
As illustrated in table 13 below the chi-square test after the training for Naïve 
Mistakes indicates that there are no significant differences between the 
control group and the experimental group. Improvements were noted in both 
groups. This means that the Naïve Mistakes on the part of those end-users 
who underwent security training do not differ significantly from those who did 
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not undergo the awareness training.  
 
Table 13: Chi-Square test results for Naive Mistakes after training 
Chi-Square Tests
.370b 1 .543
.211 1 .646
.371 1 .542
.555 .324
278
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.
04.
b. 
 
 
The continuity correction value is .211 with an associated significance level of 
.646 which is > .05.  
4.2.3.2. Detrimental Misuse  
 
 
The sample of Detrimental Misuse behaviours consisted of 17 end-users in 
the experimental group and 86 end-users in the control group. In other 
words, this is the amount of responses received for the third security test 
which was completed by both the experimental and control group members. 
The third security test relates to Detrimental Misuse behaviour (for example 
acceptable Internet usage) thus only those control and experimental group 
members who had been exposed to this particular training and security test 
were taken into account. Browse time information for some users could not 
be obtained from the SurfControl tool, and this resulted in the final N values 
depicted below.  
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for control and experimental groups for browse time before and 
after training 
Group Statistics
80 682.050 1206.0019 134.8351
17 487.235 617.1174 149.6730
74 866.230 1200.4533 139.5499
14 612.429 1167.0026 311.8946
C_E
C
E
C
E
Browse_time_b
Browse_time_a
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
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Table 15: Independent-Samples t test results for Detrimental Misuse 
Independent Samples Test
.736 .393 .646 95 .520 194.8147 301.3955 -403.5311 793.1605
.967 46.328 .339 194.8147 201.4510 -210.6077 600.2371
.281 .597 .728 86 .468 253.8012 348.4138 -438.8226 946.4249
.743 18.593 .467 253.8012 341.6905 -462.4256 970.0279
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Browse_time_b
Browse_time_a
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
As may be seen in the table above the differences between the mean browse 
times (Detrimental Misuse) of the control and the experimental groups before 
the training intervention was not significant (t= .646, p > .05). Likewise, 
after the training there was no significant difference between the 
experimental and the control groups end-users in terms of Detrimental 
Misuse (t = .728, p > .05).  
4.2.3.3. Basic Hygiene 
  
The sample consisted of 57 end-users in the experimental group and 221 
end-users in the control group. As is illustrated in table 16, before the 
training intervention, it was possible to crack 46.6% of the control group 
members’ passwords and 36.8% of the experimental group members’ 
passwords.  
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Table 16: Summary of Basic Hygiene results before training for control vs. experimental groups 
C_E * Password_Cracked_b Crosstabulation
118 103 221
122.4 98.6 221.0
53.4% 46.6% 100.0%
76.6% 83.1% 79.5%
42.4% 37.1% 79.5%
36 21 57
31.6 25.4 57.0
63.2% 36.8% 100.0%
23.4% 16.9% 20.5%
12.9% 7.6% 20.5%
154 124 278
154.0 124.0 278.0
55.4% 44.6% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
55.4% 44.6% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_b
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_b
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_b
% of Total
C
E
C_E
Total
N Y
Password_Cracked_b
Total
 
 
 
Chi-square indicates that that there is no significant difference between the 
percentage cracked in the control group and the percentage cracked in the 
experimental group. As shown in table 17 below the continuity correction 
value is 1.376 with an associated significance level of .241. 
 
Table 17: Chi-Square test results for Basic Hygiene before training 
Chi-Square Tests
1.748b 1 .186
1.376 1 .241
1.769 1 .183
.232 .120
278
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.
42.
b. 
 
The results obtained after the training indicated that there had been a 
dramatic improvement in terms of both the control group members and the 
experimental group members as it was possible to crack 16.7% only of the 
control group member passwords (down from 46.6%) while 17.5% only of 
the experimental group member passwords could be cracked (down from 
36.8%). 
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Table 18: Summary of Basic Hygiene results after training for control vs. experimental groups 
C_E * Password_Cracked_a Crosstabulation
184 37 221
183.6 37.4 221.0
83.3% 16.7% 100.0%
79.7% 78.7% 79.5%
66.2% 13.3% 79.5%
47 10 57
47.4 9.6 57.0
82.5% 17.5% 100.0%
20.3% 21.3% 20.5%
16.9% 3.6% 20.5%
231 47 278
231.0 47.0 278.0
83.1% 16.9% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
83.1% 16.9% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_a
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_a
% of Total
Count
Expected Count
% within C_E
% within Password_
Cracked_a
% of Total
C
E
C_E
Total
N Y
Password_Cracked_a
Total
 
 
 
As shown below in table 19 no significant difference exists between the two-
groups in terms of Basic Hygiene (password strength). The continuity 
correction value is .000 with a significance level of 1.000. This means that 
the Basic Hygiene behaviour of those end-users who underwent security 
training did not differ significantly from those who had not undergone the 
awareness training although it was possible to see improvements in both 
groups. 
 
 
Table 19: Chi-Square test results for Basic Hygiene after training 
Chi-Square Tests
.021b 1 .886
.000 1 1.000
.021 1 .886
.845 .511
278
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.
64.
b. 
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4.3. RESULTS OF THE INFORMATION SECURITY AWARENESS 
STRATEGY 
 
4.3.1.  Sampling 
 
As has already been mentioned the awareness training material consisted of 
a film in three parts and security tests that were administered to the 
experimental group. The control group had to complete three security tests. 
Neither group was given the correct answers to the tests. Both groups were 
eligible to take part in the competition. The first part of the competition was 
announced to both the control and the experimental group members on the 
31st July 2008 and it continued throughout August and the first week of 
September 2008. The awareness deployment closed on the 10th September 
2008 and the winner of the competition was announced on the same day. 
 
For all three parts of the competition the users were invited to participate. In 
order to be considered eligible to win one of the prizes the experimental 
group members had to view the relevant part of the film (by clicking on the 
hyperlink provided) and complete the security test. In order to stand a 
chance of winning the control group had to complete all three security tests. 
Consequently, the samples were not equal probably as a result of the fact 
that it was easier for the control group members both to enter and to take  
part in the competition than it was for the experimental group members. 
 
The three parts of the competition (corresponding to the three parts of the 
awareness movie and security tests) were administered as follows: 
 
• Part 1administered to both groups on 31 July 2008 
• Part 1 reminder administered to both groups on 8 August 2008 
• Part 2 administered to both groups on 21 August 2008 
• Reminder email sent on 2 September 2008 
• Part 3 administered to both groups on 5 September 2008. 
 
All group members had to register on a web interface in order to take part in 
the competition. In practice this meant that once the end-user has clicked on 
the link provided in the email communiqué he/she would need to fill in email 
address, name and surname. Thereafter the end-user was directed to the 
awareness film (if a member of the experimental group) or the applicable 
security test (if a member of the control group). Although 841 end-users had 
registered to take part in the competition not all the responses were valid. 
There were a number of reasons for this fact, for instance, certain end-users: 
were not in scope (not members of either the control or the experimental 
group), certain end-users registered but did not complete the necessary 
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security test (some completed part 1 but not part 2), they supplied 
incomplete/incorrect information or they submitted multiple completed 
security tests. After all the invalid and the duplicate responses had been 
discarded the following valid sample remained. 
  
 
Table 20: Valid responses obtained from questionnaires 
 
 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Control Group 221 142 86 
Experimental Group 57 30 17 
Total responses 258 172 
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4.3.2. Data collection 
 
A custom-built web interface with a Microsoft Access database on the back-
end for storing the necessary data was used to collect the end-user test 
responses. The data was stored in individual fields that could be extracted for 
later analysis. Each participant was referenced by his/her email address. 
Each row within the database contained the email address of the end-user, 
whether the end-user had been in the control group or the experimental 
group and the answers for each question in the tests. Each correct score was 
awarded one point. Thereafter, the score per test was populated in the 
security behaviour scorecard. 
4.3.3. Data Analysis 
 
 
In terms of hypothesis 2 the test scores of both the control and the 
experimental group members were compared to determine whether the 
experimental group members had fared better than the control group 
members. For test scores 1, 2 and 3 the data analysis sections below 
describe, firstly, the basic features of the statistics, and, secondly, the results 
of the t-tests and the Mann-Whitney test. 
 
4.3.3.1. Test score 1 results 
 
For test score 1, which assesses comprehension in terms of Naïve Mistakes 
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(information handling) and Basic Hygiene (password strength), the mean for 
the control group was 5.90 with a standard deviation of 1.141. This produced 
a range of scores between 4.755 and 7.037 in which two-thirds of the scores 
fell. For the experimental group the mean was slightly higher at 6.357 with a 
standard deviation of 0.862. This produced a range of scores from 5.495 to 
7.219 in which two-thirds of the sample fell. The standard deviation was 
considered relatively small and this points to overall consensus in terms of 
the questions. n was 278 (221 control group members and 57 experimental 
group members). 
 
The distribution of the results, together with a normal curve for test 1 
results, is presented in figure 7 shown. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of test 1 results 
 
 
 
The Skewness value is -1.231 and the Kurtosis is 2.036. As presented in 
table 21 below the t-test results indicate that the control group scored 
significantly lower than the experimental group for test 1 (t = -2.811, p < 
.05). 
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Table 21: Independent-samples t-test between control and experimental groups for test 1 scores 
Independent Samples Test
2.195 .140 -2.811 276 .005 -.455 .162 -.774 -.136
-3.324 113.156 .001 -.455 .137 -.726 -.184
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Test_Score_1
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
Since there was some concern about the normality of the test 1 scores a 
Mann-Whitney test was also conducted – the non-parametric alternative to 
the independent-samples t test (Pallant, 2001:255).  
 
The results of the Mann Whitney test show that for test score 1, on the 1% 
level of significance, the control group scored less than the experimental 
group since the p-value of 0.002116 < 0.01. Accordingly the results of the t 
test were confirmed. 
 
4.3.3.2. Test score 2 results 
 
Test 2 measures the understanding of the threats of malicious code and the 
requirements for proper system and software usage as specified by the AUP. 
The behaviours associated with this test were not measured in the same way 
as in the case of the other tests. This test was merely administered to the 
end-users as part of the overall Information Security Awareness Programme. 
Nevertheless it is an interesting exercise to look at these results. The mean 
for the control group was 4.162 with a standard deviation of 0.880. This 
produced a range of scores between 3.282 and 5.042 in which two-thirds of 
the scores fell. For the experimental group the mean was somewhat higher 
at 4.600 with a standard deviation of 0.563. This produced a range of scores 
from 4.037 to 5.163 in which two-thirds of the sample fell. Both standard 
deviations are small which, once again, is an indication that the questions 
posed in the test had not been ambiguous. 
 
The distribution of test 2 results together with a normal curve is shown in 
figure 8 below. n is 172 (142 control group members and 30 experimental 
group members). 
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Figure 8: Distribution of test 2 results 
 
 
The Skewness value is -1.001 and the Kurtosis is.691. Since the Skewness 
and Kurtosis values are acceptable an independent-samples t test was 
administered.  The results are shown in table 22 below. 
 
Table 22: Independent-samples t test between control and experimental groups for test 2 scores 
 
Independent Samples Test
4.323 .039 -2.611 170 .010 -.438 .168 -.769 -.107
-3.459 63.197 .001 -.438 .127 -.691 -.185
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Test_Score_2
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
 
 
As shown above the t-test results indicate that the control group scored 
significantly lower than the experimental group in terms of test 2 (t = -
3.459, p < .05). 
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4.3.3.3. Test score 3 results 
 
 
Test 3 measured the understanding of the Internet and Email usage sections 
of the AUP. The mean of the control group was 3.430 with a standard 
deviation of 1.035. This produced a range between 2.395 and 4.465. In the 
case of the experimental group the mean was significantly higher at 4.647 
with a standard deviation of 0.606. This created a range from 4.041 to 
5.253. The standard deviations were small thus indicating consensus in 
terms of the questions in the test. The distribution of test 3 results, together 
with a normal curve, are presented in figure 9 below. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of test 3 results 
 
The Skewness value is -.468 and the Kurtosis is -.325. Since the Skewness 
and Kurtosis values are acceptable an independent-samples t-test was 
administered.  The results are presented in table 23 below. 
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Table 23: Independent-samples t test between control and experimental groups for test 3 scores 
Independent Samples Test
6.359 .013 -4.679 101 .000 -1.217 .260 -1.733 -.701
-6.591 37.410 .000 -1.217 .185 -1.591 -.843
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Test_score_3
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
 
As shown in table 23 above according to the t test results the control group 
scored significantly lower than the experimental group for test 3 (t = -6.591, 
p < .05). 
 
 
4.3.4. Relationship between test scores and behaviours 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that internalised knowledge is necessary for appropriate 
behaviour to be enacted. In other words, one would expect to see a 
relationship between test scores (as discussed previously) and the associated 
behaviours in terms of which a higher test score would be associated with a 
decrease in Naïve Mistakes, a decrease in Detrimental Misuse and an 
increase in Basic Hygiene. The experimental group behaviour was divided 
into positive and negative behaviour and the associated scores for the 
appropriate test were compared. 
 
The following test scenarios were carried out on the experimental group data 
which had been obtained after training: 
• In terms of Naïve Mistakes did those group members who acted 
correctly (not be taken in by a phishing scam) obtain a significantly 
better score for test 1 than those group members who did not act 
correctly? 
• In terms of Basic Hygiene did those group members who acted 
correctly (chose a strong password) obtain a significantly better score 
for test 1 than those group members who did not act correctly? 
• In terms of Detrimental Misuse did those group members who acted 
correctly (spent less time browsing) obtain a significantly better score 
for test 3 than those group members who did not act correctly? 
 
 
In terms of Naïve Mistakes the mean test score of those group members who 
did act correctly was 6.42 compared to the score of 6.30 obtained by those 
group members who did not act correctly. The relevant statistics are 
presented in table 24 below.  
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Table 24: Descriptive statistics for experimental group test scores and Naïve Mistakes 
Group Statistics
24 6.42 .776 .158
33 6.30 .918 .160
Phishing_A
N
Y
Test_Score_1
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
 
 
However, the differences in the mean observed are not statistically 
significantly different as is shown by the following results – t =.492, p > .05. 
 
Table 25: t-test for experimental group test scores and Naïve Mistakes 
Independent Samples Test
.458 .501 .492 55 .625 .114 .231 -.349 .577
.505 53.689 .616 .114 .225 -.337 .565
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Test_Score_1
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
Thus, based on these results, it may be concluded that those experimental 
group members who acted correctly after undergoing training did not obtain 
a significantly higher test score than those group members who did not act 
correctly. 
 
In terms of Basic Hygiene those group members who did act correctly 
obtained a mean test score of 6.28 compared to those who did not act 
correctly whose score was 6.70. The relevant statistics are presented in table 
26 below. 
 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for experimental group test scores and Basic Hygiene 
Group Statistics
47 6.28 .902 .132
10 6.70 .483 .153
Password_A
N
Y
Test_Score_1
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
 
As illustrated in table 27 below significant differences were observed in the 
mean scores – t= -2.100, p < .05. This statistically significant difference is 
unexpected and it would appear that a very good understanding of Basic 
Hygiene does not necessarily ensure that the correct behaviour will be 
carried out. 
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Table 27: t-test for experimental group test scores and Basic Hygiene 
Independent Samples Test
5.596 .022 -1.435 55 .157 -.423 .295 -1.015 .168
-2.100 24.643 .046 -.423 .202 -.839 -.008
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Test_Score_1
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
 
In terms of Detrimental Misuse the mean browse time for experimental group 
members after training was 612.43 minutes. The Skewness level was 3.001 
and the Kurtosis level is 9.429. Therefore since the normality of the data is of 
concern, the non-parametric Spearman Rank Order correlation statistic was 
used. The outcome of this statistic is presented in table 28 below. 
 
 
Table 28: Spearman Rank Order Correlation results for the experimental group after training 
Correlations
1.000 -.099
. .737
14 14
-.099 1.000
.737 .
14 17
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Browse_Time_After
Test_Score_3
Spearman's rho
Browse_
Time_After Test_Score_3
 
 
As illustrated in table 28 above there appears to be no correlation between 
the test score results (on Internet acceptable usage) and the actual browse 
times of end-users in the experimental group after training. A good or bad 
score obtained for test 3 appears not to be associated in any way with the 
actual browse time behaviours of end-users. This is further confirmed by the 
results presented in table 29 below. This table illustrates the results of a 
Spearman Rank Order correlation test between the control group and the 
experimental group browse times before training and the control and the 
experimental group browse times after training. On the 1% level of 
significance there appears to be a strong correlation between browse times 
prior to training and after training. 
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Table 29: Correlation between browse times before and after training. 
Correlations
1.000 .693**
. .000
97 86
.693** 1.000
.000 .
86 88
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Browse_time_b
Browse_time_a
Spearman's rho
Browse_
time_b
Browse_
time_a
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
4.4. HYPOTHESIS 1: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
The first hypothesis is a composite construct which comprises three sub-
hypotheses. This first hypothesis states that end-user exposure to 
security awareness training affects three specific security behaviours in 
the following ways. 
 
The measurement of information handling was translated into the 
category of Naïve Mistakes and the susceptibility of end-users to fall for a 
phishing attack was measured. Based on the data analysis presented 
previously it may be concluded that the impact of information security 
awareness training on this particular type of behaviour is not significant in 
terms of this case study. Improvements were observed in both groups 
after training. However, in this case it is not possible to attribute the 
improvement to training alone. It is very likely that the security test 
written by both groups may have been a factor in influencing the 
compliant behaviour. As far as the researcher was aware there was no 
other intervention in terms of these groups. Therefore, based on the data 
from this research, it is not possible to support this sub-hypothesis. There 
is no evidence that exposure to security training alone has a positive 
effect on Naïve Mistakes. 
 
The measurement of acceptable usage of Internet facilities was translated 
into a Detrimental Misuse category and one variable within this category 
was measured – total Internet browse times on the part of end-users over 
a two-week period. Based on the data analysis presented in the previous 
chapter it was concluded that, despite the lowered mean in the observed 
behaviour (improved browsed times), the difference between the control 
and experimental groups before and after the training is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the impact of information security awareness 
training on this particular behaviour is not of any significance for this 
study. In this case it would appear that exposure to training does not lead 
to a noticeable improvement in compliant behaviour. Awareness training 
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appears not to be sufficient to ensure end-user security compliant 
behaviour and, therefore, it is not possible to support this sub-hypothesis.  
 
The measurement of password management best practices was translated 
into a Basic Hygiene category and one variable, namely, password 
strength was measured. Based on the data analysis presented earlier it 
may be concluded that no significant differences between the control and 
the experimental groups exist. Therefore the impact of information 
security awareness training on this behaviour is not significant.  In this 
case a dramatic improvement was seen in the password strength of both 
the control group and the experimental group members. Nevertheless, it 
would appear that that this improvement was not due only to the training. 
Awareness training alone appears to be insufficient to ensure end-user 
security compliant behaviour in this regard and, therefore, this sub-
hypothesis is not supported. The likely cause of the improvement in both 
groups was probably as a result of the fact that both groups had to 
complete a security test. The test (which did not provide answers to the 
questions) may have triggered an understanding from prior learning 
about password strength and thereby reinforced the subsequent 
compliant behaviour.  
 
Based on the results of these sub-hypotheses it is not possible to support 
hypothesis 1. However the outcome of this research does not mean that 
information security awareness training has no impact on information 
security behaviour. In future multiple variables may have to be examined 
in order to determine the broader impact of information security 
awareness training on information security behaviour. The implications 
are that information security awareness training alone appears to be 
inadequate to ensure that end-user behaviour is compliant and to prevent 
non-compliant behaviour (for the behavioural indicators observed). The 
writing of the security test itself may have had a security effect on the 
control group by reinforcing prior learning. This is supported by the fact 
that both groups achieved very high test scores on average. 
 
 
4.5. HYPOTHESIS 2: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
The second hypothesis states that end-user exposure to security 
awareness training increases the internalisation of security knowledge. 
The statistical results were presented in the previous chapter. Three sets 
of scores were examined in terms of this hypothesis — control group and 
experimental group scores for security tests one, two and three. In each 
case the control group scores were compared to the experimental group 
scores.  
 
Based on the results it would appear that, for all the tests undertaken by 
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the control and the experimental group members, the experimental group 
scored higher than the control group. The implications of this are, firstly, 
the training seemed to be effective in this case as the end-users in the 
experimental group fared statistically better than the control group end-
users. Therefore, within this specific organisation and based on the 
sample in this research it would appear that hypothesis 2 is supported by 
the data presented earlier. 
4.6. HYPOTHESIS 3: INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
The final hypothesis proposes that internalised security information (as 
measured by hypothesis 2) is necessary for users to enact appropriate 
security behaviours. Therefore it may be expected that end-users with 
high test scores would manifest compliant security behaviours. 
Experimental group end-user data after the members of the experimental 
group had undergone training was analysed. The following scenarios were 
examined:  
 
a) In terms of Naïve Mistakes did those whose behaviour was 
compliant (not fall for a phishing scam) obtain a significantly better 
score for test 1 than those whose behaviour was not compliant? 
The results indicate that even though those members of the 
experimental group who did manifest compliant behaviour obtained 
a higher mean test score than those who manifested non-complaint 
behaviour the difference was not statistically significant.   
 
b) In terms of Basic Hygiene did those whose behaviour was 
compliant (chose stronger passwords) obtain a significantly better 
score for test 1 than those whose behaviour was not compliant? 
The results indicate that those members of the experimental group 
who manifested non-compliant behaviour scored higher in the test 
than those whose behaviour was compliant. The difference in 
scores is statistically significant. On the other hand, the group 
which was compliant had obtained a very high mean score of 90%. 
In fact, both results (within the experimental group) were very high 
which implies that internalised knowledge of security may be 
necessary but is not sufficient to prevent poor security behaviour in 
this case. 
 
 
c) In terms of Detrimental Misuse did those who manifested compliant 
behaviour (spent less time browsing) score better on test 3 than 
those who manifested non-compliant behaviour? There appears to 
be no association between better test scores and improved browse 
times and vice versa.  
  
It may, therefore, be concluded that obtaining a high score is not 
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necessarily an indication of compliant security behaviour. Based on the 
data from this research it is not possible to support hypothesis 3. 
 
4.7. TENABLITY OF THE THOERETICAL MODEL 
 
Explicit knowledge was provided to end-users in the form of the security 
awareness film. This knowledge was also made implicit by the fact that 
the end-users were required to write a security test. This implicit 
knowledge was measured and it was found that the training material must 
have been internalised since those end-users who had undergone training 
obtained higher test scores than those who had not undergone training. 
In that sense the impact of information security training was effective. 
However, based on the data at hand the subsequent requisite compliant 
security behaviour was not apparent. Since the theoretical model 
proposed in chapter 1 was based on the hypotheses presented in the 
previous sections it may be concluded that the model is partially 
supported by the data generated by this research. However, based on the 
existing data, internalised knowledge of security requirements is not 
sufficient to influence the required behaviours. This has implications for 
the existing literature as will be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter.  Further studies should be conducted in order to verify the 
external validity of these results. 
 
4.8. LITERATURE IMPLICATIONS 
 
This research modifies the previous conclusions reached by researchers 
such as McCoy and Fowler (2004:349) and Sommers & Robinson 
(2004:379) who all experienced difficulties in measuring the effectiveness 
of their security awareness interventions and, consequently, did not carry 
out such measurements. This research has shown that measuring 
effectiveness of security awareness training is plausible and does provide 
valuable results. 
 
In addition, based on the data of this research, the outcome may not 
always be expected and this, in one sense, supports some of the 
conclusions reached by Anandpara et al. (2007). Anandpara et al showed 
that, even when users underwent security education on phishing, the 
results did not indicate an improvement in the ability of the participants to 
identify phishing scams. All that actually happened was that the 
participants became more suspicious. So, in this respect, the research of 
Anandpara and colleagues is confirmed (2007). This research also 
supports their research which concluded that obtaining a high test score 
does not necessarily mean an improved ability to identify a phishing 
scam. This research also extends their research since, in this research, 
actual behaviour is measured and, therefore, this study is not burdened 
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with the subject-expectancy effect.  
 
In addition, the work of Furnell (2005) and Srikwan and Jakobsson, 
(2007) regarding the necessity of end-users understanding the underlying 
threat when it comes to awareness and the lack of effectiveness of 
(online) education is both supported and extended. Hypothesis 2 revealed 
that the training administered had been effective and that end-user 
feedback had been overwhelmingly positive. 
 
On one level this research modifies the previous conclusions of writers 
and practitioners who believed that it is futile to educate users (Ranum, 
2005; Evers, 2006; Nielsen, 2004). Based on this research it is clear that 
this view is rather too simplistic. This research has demonstrated that 
end-users did show an improved understanding of security and compliant 
behaviour was demonstrated. However, compliant behaviour has not been 
linked solely to the outcome of awareness training. The results of this 
research suggest that, while awareness is necessary, it is not sufficient to 
ensure compliance on the part of end-users. The data also suggests that 
security tests carried out by end-users may also have a moderating effect 
on their behaviour. Utterances by the aforementioned researchers are not 
helpful and confuse the nature of the problem even further. In this regard 
it would be more helpful to pose questions such as under what 
circumstances is it futile to educate users?  Further evidence that 
awareness training is but one intervention necessary for compliance is 
provided by Straub & Welke (199:19). They state that the dissemination 
of security material, as well as publicly advertised efforts to detect non-
compliant behaviour, will significantly deter such behaviour.  
 
Ultimately, the answer may be to turn to the social theories and to look at 
aspects such as attitudes which affect intentions and which, ultimately, 
affect behaviour (Lee & Lee, 2002:60). The results of this research  
supports the importance of the behavioural aspects that have been called 
for previously by researchers such as Schultz, 2004:1, Siponen, 2001:24, 
Srikwan and Jakobsson, 2007:2 and Van Niekerk and von Solms, 2004. 
 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of this research is its support of 
previous writers in the field of Behavioural Information Security. This field 
looks at the motivations behind security related behaviours. At face value 
the results support further exploration of the work of Kruger and Kearney 
(2005) who maintain that behaviour is determined by affect (a person’s 
emotions), behaviour (intention to act in a certain manner) and cognition 
(beliefs in respect of a certain issue). Pahnila et al. (2007) maintain that 
the promoting of positive social pressure supports actual compliance with 
policies. They are of the opinion that this should be accomplished by 
stating explicitly what needs to be done. All these arguments may be 
regarded as contributing factors to increasing compliance with policies. It 
is also possible that other factors, such as the values and beliefs of 
individuals, may also interfere with end-user behaviour. Thus, despite the 
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fact that an employee may have fully comprehended the policy the 
employee may not act as required if there is a conflict with his/her belief 
system (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In respect of to the health care 
community it has been argued that a security culture needs to be 
entrenched in order for the security to become effective. This would 
require, inter alia, strong commitment on the part of senior management 
and clear lines of accountability and responsibility (Gaunt, 2000:157; 
Kajava & Siponen, 1997; Mitnick & Simon, 2002:252). The problem is 
more complex than merely heightening the awareness of employees – 
ethical considerations, external factors and the way in which employees 
perceive the organisation may all play a role in influencing security 
complaint behaviour. 
 
The outcome of this research also refutes the conclusions of Vroom and 
von Solms (2004:191) who assert that it is far too difficult a process to 
measure employee behaviour and that the process could be flawed. This 
research has shown that, although the process may be complex, it is, 
nevertheless, possible and may also be automated to a large degree. The 
research has uncovered a wealth of information which would merit future 
analysis and also further work on developing a reliable measurement 
framework based on previous studies. This study is undoubtedly plausible. 
 
Finally, this research also supports and extends the conclusions of 
Stanton et al. (2005). As in this study their conclusions demonstrate that 
the sharing of one’s password (categorised as Naïve Mistakes) was not 
associated with training and awareness. Further conclusions by Stanton et 
al. (2005) found that the choice of strong passwords (Basic Hygiene) was 
associated with awareness and training. However this finding was not 
corroborated by this research. It must also be borne in mind that Stanton 
et al. (2005) used a national survey for their study whereas this research 
used direct-observation in a case study in which actual user behaviour 
was measured. It is, therefore, obvious that this study extended the 
conclusions and research of Stanton et al. (2005). 
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4.9. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presents the results of the research strategies implemented 
in respect of each hypothesis. The results were presented in terms of 
sampling, data collection and data analysis. It would appear that security 
awareness intervention alone does not significantly influence security 
behaviours as measured in terms of Naïve Mistakes, Detrimental Misuse 
and Basic Hygiene. Although dramatic improvements were noted after the 
awareness training these improvements were observed in both groups 
(most notably in Basic Hygiene) and could, therefore, not be attributed to 
training alone. It would seem that the completing of the security tests 
was a factor in influencing subsequent compliant behaviour by possibly 
triggering prior learning. The security awareness training was effective in 
terms of internalised knowledge as the experimental group scored 
significantly better than the control group. Finally, it was shown in this 
study that undergoing training and achieving high scores in the security 
tests were not associated with compliant behaviour. 
 
The results of this study were, thus, referenced to prior research studies 
and areas in which these results support, extend and refute existing 
research. Further research in the field of Behavioural Information Security 
is strongly advocated. 
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 CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION  
  
 
And those who were seen dancing were thought to be insane by those who could not 
hear the music.  
Friedrich Nietzsche (Quote DB, 2008) 
 
5.1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
There are two major contributions made by this research report. Firstly, it 
was shown that there is a dearth of in-depth information and security 
awareness research and that behavioural concepts are not properly taken 
into account in security awareness programmes. There is also a lack of 
theoretical models which explain the way in which awareness training 
affects behaviour. This study built on existing behavioural information 
security research and proposes a theoretical model which is based on an 
organisational learning model.  
 
Secondly, this research tested the proposed model empirically by using 
system-generated data as indicators of behaviour in a pretest-posttest 
experimental design. Therefore no reliance was placed on the perceptions 
of users in respect of their own behaviour. Previous research has used 
interviews, surveys and “participatory observation” in order to draw 
conclusions about end-user behaviours in this regard. This study 
measured the subset of behaviours required by a typical AUP whereas 
much of the previous and recent research in respect of training 
effectiveness has focused on phishing related threats. The objective of 
this research was to determine the effectiveness of the information 
security awareness training that was administered to end-users. The 
research produced a set of instruments that could be used for behavioural 
measurement in future research. It is these preceding factors which the 
researcher believes sets this research apart from the existing literature 
and contributes to the resolution of the research problem. The outcome of 
this research could help researchers and practitioners understand the 
reasons why an awareness initiative is expected to produce certain results 
in respect of security behaviour and, consequently, this model would 
provide practitioners with practical guidance in terms of their information 
security programmes. 
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5.2. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 
The results of this research found that the security awareness training 
was effective in terms of the end-users in question retaining more 
security knowledge than those end-users who had not undergone security 
awareness training. However, there was no evidence to suggest that 
security awareness alone is sufficient to ensure compliant behaviour by 
end-users. Although dramatic improvements were noted after the 
awareness training these improvements were seen in both groups (most 
notably for Basic Hygiene) and could, therefore, not be attributed to 
training alone. It would appear that completing the security tests was a 
factor in influencing subsequent compliant behaviour by possibly 
triggering prior learning. It is further maintained that security awareness 
training is a necessary, integral component that may influence compliant 
behaviour but is not adequate to do so fully. Practitioners must insist that 
their security awareness programmes are measured in terms of 
effectiveness and that these programmes should focus on behavioural 
aspects in order to complement awareness initiatives. Finally, this study 
showed that undergoing training and achieving high scores in the security 
tests were not associated with compliant behaviour. 
 
Table 30 explains the outcomes of the hypothesis testing. 
 
 
Table 30: Hypothesis testing outcome 
 
Hypothesis 
# 
Explanation Verdict 
H1 This hypothesis tested the impact 
of security awareness training on 
three security behaviours. 
Improvements were noted in both 
groups but these were not 
attributed solely to training.  
Not Supported 
H2  This hypothesis test end-users’ 
comprehension of the policy. The 
group that underwent the training 
achieved a significantly better test 
score than those that had not 
undergone training. 
Supported 
H3  End-users who underwent training 
and subsequently exhibited non-
compliant behaviour did not score 
significantly lower on the security 
test than those who were 
compliant. 
Not Supported 
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5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.3.1. Recommendations for further study 
 
Security awareness training should influence all employees within an 
organisation to ensure the appropriate behaviour is enacted by all and, in 
this way, bring about compliance with information security policies. In 
order to confirm this statement the following questions should be further 
explored: In terms of explicit knowledge what type of security awareness 
training would be more likely to influence behaviour i.e. how important is 
the quality of the awareness material and the mechanism of delivery? 
What role do security tests play in refreshing the prior security knowledge 
of users?  In what ways could practitioners deliver the awareness 
message more effectively in order to ensure greater participation on the 
part of end-users? This research employed a novel way in which to 
distribute the awareness material to end-user desktops. Standardised, 
cost-effective and automated mechanisms for gathering system generated 
data (especially for those behaviours which require high levels of 
expertise) and the feasibility of such mechanisms merit additional 
investigation. This research has demonstrated that it is possible to 
automate security behaviour measurement by using standard techniques 
and tools. In terms of implicit knowledge further standardised 
mechanisms should be explored to determine how best to measure 
implicit knowledge whilst also taking into account the role of principles of 
the learning sciences. What are the most effective learning principles and 
under what conditions are they effective? It is also important that future 
research determine the status of employees within the organisation and 
the role played by this in awareness training. Once users have fully 
comprehended policies are the same types of interventions necessary in 
order to sustain the required behaviours? This is important as it would 
probably determine the frequency of future awareness interventions. 
Longitudinal studies in this regard would be necessary. Longitudinal 
studies are also needed in order to determine the impact of behaviour 
over the long term. An understanding of the influence of factors such as 
user attitude, perceptions and corporate politics on the internalisation of 
the security awareness message and subsequent behaviour is also 
essential. Finally, further research is needed on a taxonomy of security 
behaviours. Such research would further build on the work of Stanton et 
al. (2005). 
 
5.3.2. Recommendation and Implications for the Industry  
 
 
According to Dhillon (1999) increasing the awareness of security issues is 
the most cost-effective control that may be implemented by an 
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organisation. Research that contributes to the effectiveness of awareness 
would ultimately benefit organisations as a whole as such research would 
allow organisations to focus on techniques that would improve the 
intentions of their employees and ultimately enhance end-user security 
behaviours. The literature survey in chapter 2 strongly implies that further 
research is needed in this respect. Diverse methods to be used in the 
measuring of different behaviours are also called for (Stanton et al., 
2005) and this need has been highlighted by this research. This research 
also contributes to a standard set of instruments that could be useful to 
practitioners in the future. The techniques used in this report to measure 
security behaviours could be expanded to include a basket of security 
behaviours. The instruments used are more suitable to measuring 
behaviour which requires low technical expertise and measurements of 
malicious types of behaviour would not be as easy to obtain (Stanton et 
al., 2005). Hence, in this respect, other methods would have to be used 
and there are commercial tools available for this. Nevertheless, these 
types of measurements could be presented to senior management as part 
of the monthly security report. 
 
The implications for practitioners are potentially significant. In order for 
an organisation to implement effective information security it is essential 
to gain the understanding of all the employees within the organisation. In 
addition, compliance with security policies is necessary and, in some 
cases, this compliance needs to be demonstrated by either the 
information security function or the risk management function within an 
organisation in order to justify their activities. At face value the outcome 
of this research points to the fact that security awareness training, while 
important, is not sufficient to prevent non-compliant behaviour and to 
ensure compliant behaviour. Practitioners should, therefore, not rely on 
awareness alone if they wish the message to be both meaningful and 
effective. The literature survey points to many examples in terms of which 
reliance is placed on awareness alone. This research provides pragmatic 
guidance for practitioners when designing and implementing their 
information security awareness programmes. 
   
The results of this research could also be financially beneficial to 
organisations since, if it is further corroborated that behavioural security 
aspects such as attitude, and positive reinforcement are key, then 
organisations could channel their resources into the most cost-effective 
methods. It is not cost effective to spend blindly on information security 
awareness campaigns without an appropriate mechanism to measure the 
effectiveness of these campaigns and whether a difference is made to 
actual behaviour. Therefore, it must be ascertained which techniques 
have the greatest impact on behaviour as this would result in the most 
effective techniques being used and inefficient techniques being avoided. 
The altering of the intentions of employees to become more positive 
would, ultimately, benefit organisations. Thus the outcomes of this 
research could enable organisations to focus on techniques that improve 
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their employees’ intentions and, ultimately, encourage more positive end 
user security behaviours. In addition, this research contributes a set of 
tools or techniques that future researchers and practitioners could use 
and improve in order to measure end-user behaviour.  
 
5.4. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
It is important to note that there are a number of extenuating 
circumstances and boundaries in terms of this research. Firstly, the 
instrument used to measure Detrimental Misuse could, in some respects, 
be considered a blunt tool as it also measured internal browsing, for 
example, browsing of the corporate Intranet as well as Internet browsing. 
In addition, this particular behavioural measurement did not distinguish 
between “good” browsing and “bad” browsing. For example, browsing 
Internet banking websites may be considered “good” browsing as opposed 
to online gaming which is considered a waste of company resources. The 
organisation’s AUP allows for business-related and, even occasional 
personal, browsing. However, the policy is not prescriptive about limits 
and about what is acceptable. Email abuse by end-users was also not 
measured. 
 
In terms of Basic Hygiene the passwords tested had already been 
subjected to password complexity rules. This means that the system had 
already screened the passwords chosen by users before the passwords 
were accepted by the system. Thus users could not simply enter 123 as a 
password. Enforced password complexity may, therefore, have played a 
role in minimising the differences between the control and the 
experimental group members since both groups would have had to enter 
passwords with at least a basic level of complexity. Note that password 
complexity rules do not guarantee that users will choose strong 
passwords. This is substantiated by the fact that prior to training it was 
possible to crack a total of 922 passwords with password complexity 
which had been enabled on the system. 
 
Finally, translating the organisation’s AUP into film format was challenging 
since there was a lot of material that had to be conveyed. Accordingly it 
was necessary to divide the film into three 15-minute parts and to screen 
these separate parts to users at separate times. Consequently user 
participation waned from the first to the third showing of the film (see 
chapter 4 for the response rates for each part of the film). Despite 
coupling the awareness to a competition and sending out reminder emails 
to end-users the response rate was lower than anticipated. Future 
research could couple this awareness training to the employee 
performance contract to ensure a high response rate. 
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
 
The contribution of this research is significant in the following ways: The 
research comprised a case study that used system generated data to 
measure actual user behaviour both before and after the security 
awareness training intervention in order to determine the effectiveness of 
the training. For this reason no reliance was placed on the perceptions of 
the users about their own behaviour. Existing research has used 
interviews, surveys and “participatory observation” in order to draw 
conclusions about end-user behaviour in this regard. This research 
measured a subset of the behaviours required by a typical Acceptable 
Usage Policy, whereas much of the existing and even recent research with 
respect to awareness training effectiveness has focused on phishing 
related threats in a laboratory environment. This research not only 
demonstrated the impact of security awareness training on user 
behaviour but it also makes a contribution to devising a set of instruments 
that could be used in future research on behavioural measurement. This 
research aimed to consolidate the security awareness research landscape 
and to move towards a common understanding and language of the 
meaning of “security behaviour”. 
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The following text is an extract from the Acceptable Usage Policy of the 
organisation in question. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Acceptable Usage Policy shall be deemed to have been accepted by the User 
(being the Employee or a Trading Partner) on commencement of the employment 
relationship or business relationship, as the case may be. 
 
Information is an asset that the organisation heavily relies on to conduct its daily 
business, to make informed business decisions and to achieve its vision and 
business goals.  To support the effective usage of these Information Assets, IT 
Systems have been installed as key business tools. 
 
This policy guides the usage and maintenance of the organisation’s information and 
the supporting equipment and Systems to assist with: 
• The completion of all business processes within reasonable time; 
• Business decisions being based on reliable and up to date information; 
• The achievement of cost savings through the optimal usage of the resources. 
 
Abuse of the organisation’s IT Systems can have far-reaching repercussions such as 
exposure to risks, compromise of Systems and services and legal issues and is 
therefore seen as a serious offence.  Any breach of these regulations will result in 
disciplinary action being taken against offenders, in accordance with the 
organisation’s disciplinary procedures.  The aim of this policy is not to impose 
restrictions that are contrary to TOPAZ CC’s established culture of openness, trust 
and integrity, but rather to ensure that the organisation is adequately protected from 
illegal or damaging actions by Individuals, either knowingly or unknowingly. 
 
COMPLIANCE, MONITORING AND AUDITING 
 
Failure to comply with this policy or any of the supporting and complimenting 
policies, standards and / or processes will result in a security violation and the 
appropriate disciplinary action being taken.  The appendices form part of this 
policy and must be read in conjunction with the document. 
 
TOPAZ CC reserves the right to intercept and/or monitor all communications 
and/or the use of all IT Systems and services, including (without limitation) e-mail 
and Internet usage, for security, management and maintenance purposes and any 
other lawful purpose.  Workstations may be regularly audited to confirm 
compliance to the acceptable use of the equipment.  Should inappropriate content 
or use be identified, disciplinary action may be taken in accordance with the 
APPENDIX A – ACCEPTABLE USAGE POLICY 
(AUP) 
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organisation’s official disciplinary procedures.  Interception and/or Monitoring 
activities may take place without prior notification if deemed necessary.  
 
EXCEPTION HANDLING 
 
All exceptions to this Acceptable Usage Policy will be fully motivated and 
documented by those seeking an exception to the policy, and agreed to by the 
relevant affected parties. All exceptions will be reviewed at least annually by the 
relevant Individual/s tasked with risk management around the particular area/s 
affected by the exception. 
 
GENERAL USE AND OWNERSHIP 
 
The workstation(s), other IT Systems, and access to the organisation’s IT Systems 
and information are provided to you to enable you to fulfil your daily function in 
the organisation.  It is therefore expected of you to: 
1. Use the Systems primarily for organisational business purposes, with good 
judgement exercised regarding the reasonableness of personal use; 
2. Use the access and information solely for organisational business purposes, 
whilst striving to maintain the privacy and confidentiality thereof as per the 
organisation’s non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements; 
3. Use the IT Systems as set up, without attempting to change the security 
settings and configuration, including the hardware; 
4. Take note that all information created on or stored on the organisation’s 
Systems is the property of TOPAZ CC, regardless whether originally 
created for personal or organisational use and its confidentiality therefore 
cannot be guaranteed.  For instance, when leaving the organisation’s 
employ or during suspension you may therefore not delete or copy any 
work-related information, including e-mail; 
5. Not abuse the organisation’s IT resources or those of any other 
organisation you utilise in the course of your daily operations; 
6. Adhere to good risk management practices, such as clean desks and secure 
laptop usage; 
7. Not connect any devices, whether internal or external, to the provided IT 
System, unless authorised; 
8. Not connect IT Systems, including workstations and laptops, not owned by 
TOPAZ CC to the TOPAZ CC production environment, unless authorised 
by IS; 
9. Not create or connect to any domains other than the official TOPAZ CC 
production environment domains; 
10. Not make your workstation available for remote use and/or management, 
unless specifically authorised. 
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LOGICAL ACCESS CONTROL 
 
Your user ID and password are the key defences for the organisation’s equipment, 
Systems and information.  To protect these, you are expected: 
1. Not to allow other Users to use your user ID as you will be held 
responsible for all activities performed with it; 
2. To use well chosen passwords and change them regularly, as prompted by 
the various Systems.  Where possible, ensure that the password consists of 
mixed case, numerical characters and special characters and avoid the use 
of personal information and dictionary words in the password; 
3. Not to share your password with anyone, including IT support staff, nor to 
keep a record of it in an obvious place; 
4. Not to use any other User’s user ID and password; 
5. To take corrective steps, should you suspect that your user ID and 
password have in any way been compromised; 
6. Not to request any password to be reset, other than your own, nor to 
attempt to guess other Users’ passwords.  Managers may request the reset 
of passwords on behalf of their Employees, provided that proof of the 
request from the Employee can be provided upon demand; 
7. Not to select the option to remember your password when logging on to 
applications, services and network links, including the Internet; 
8. To use the Windows lock mechanism (CTRL + ALT + DEL to activate) 
or terminate active application sessions when leaving your workstation 
unattended for an extended period of time; 
9. Not to access information resources not within the scope of your work.  
The principle of least privilege access will be applied; 
10. To respect the access assigned to you and not to abuse your legal access or 
any privileged access, such as provided to administrators for monitoring 
purposes. 
 
MALICIOUS CODE / VIRUS PROTECTION 
 
The organisation’s information is vulnerable to attack from viruses and other 
malicious code.  Although technical solutions have been implemented to mitigate 
the risks posed by viruses, the speed with which these are developed and spread 
requires that every User additionally takes certain actions to minimise the risks.  
These are as follows: 
1. Respond immediately to any viruses or malicious code the anti-malicious 
code software detects on your workstation by informing the IS Command 
Centre.  The IS Command Centre will assist in identifying and removing 
the malicious code and repairing any damage that resulted from the 
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malicious code infection; 
2. Do not de-install, deactivate, reconfigure or attempt to circumvent the anti-
malicious code software installed on your workstation; 
3. Do not attempt to bypass the automated logon scripts aimed at updating the 
anti-malicious code software and virus definitions / signature files and 
operating system patches; 
4. Do not open suspicious e-mail attachments even if they are from known 
and trusted sources; 
5. Do not execute programmes received by e-mail until it has been 
determined that the programmes are from a trusted source; 
6. Do not download software from an unknown and untrusted source.  Only 
use software obtained from IS.  Only authorised Individuals may download 
software for test purposes in controlled environments; 
7. Do not knowingly get involved in any action that would lead to the 
creation or distribution of viruses or other malicious code; 
8. Ignore all pop-up windows appearing on screen when browsing the 
Internet, as these may contain Spyware, which is defined as any software 
that covertly gathers information about a User while he / she is navigating 
the Internet and then transmits the information to an Individual or 
organisation that uses it for marketing or other purposes; 
9. Do not forward or create any virus notifications or hoax messages.  All 
communication regarding viruses or other malicious code will be done via 
official communication channels; 
10. Do not use any IT System unless IS has authorised and confirmed to you 
that it has scrutinised and verified the IT Systems and anti-malicious code 
installations of third parties reporting to you that need to connect to the 
TOPAZ CC network. 
 
MOBILE COMPUTING 
 
When using mobile computing devices, including but not limited to laptops, 
notebooks, PDAs and mobile phones, special care should be taken to ensure that 
the organisational information stored thereon is not compromised.  Therefore, the 
following applies: 
1. IS support will only be provided for approved mobile computing device 
models and brand names; 
2. Personally owned mobile computing devices will only be allowed 
connectivity to the environment after approval and scrutiny from IS; 
3. Secure settings will be implemented by IS on all mobile computing 
devices taking into consideration the limitations of the individual devices.  
These may not be circumvented; 
4. Extra care should be taken when using mobile computing devices in public 
places, meeting rooms and other unprotected areas outside the 
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organisation’s premises to avoid the risk of accidental or deliberate 
information gathering by unauthorised parties and to protect the device 
from theft or destruction. 
 
SOFTWARE USAGE 
 
The workstation(s) and other IT Systems provided to you are supplied with all the 
software that you need for work purposes.  All software needed to maintain and 
keep track of the IT System has also been installed on it and may not be tampered 
with.  IS will not support any non-standard configurations and reserves the right to 
remove these from the network should they pose a security risk to the organisation.  
To ensure that the software continues to fulfil its intended purpose, you are 
expected to: 
1. Not under any circumstances install or download any unauthorised or 
unlicensed software, including games; 
2. Not take it upon yourself to install patches and service packs, except when 
clearly instructed by the IS Command Centre.  An automated function will 
ensure that your workstation is adequately protected as required by the 
organisation; 
3. Contact the IS Command Centre if you need additional software as they 
will ensure that your request is dealt with via the correct procedures and 
that only properly authorised and licensed software is installed; 
4. Procure all software via the IS Management Services and related 
procurement processes. 
5. The retrieval of executable files, including freeware or shareware is strictly 
prohibited, unless for business purposes. 
 
INTERNET USAGE 
 
The Internet can be a valuable source of information, but at the same time poses 
serious risks to the organisation’s information, Systems and network resources.  
Therefore, it is important to take note of the following: 
1. Access to the Internet will be granted by management for business-related 
purposes only to further the interests of the organisation and its clients and 
customers.  Acceptable use includes the downloading of software upgrades 
and patches by IT support, review of possible vendor sites for product 
information, reference of regulatory or technical information and research.  
It should not be used for private business activities, amusement or 
entertainment purposes.  Occasional personal use of the Internet is 
permitted at the discretion of your manager and/or the Chief Information 
Officer (CIO), which is a privilege that should not be abused.  Follow the 
corporate principles regarding resource usage and exercise good judgement 
when using the Internet; 
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2. Internet usage is recorded and reported on.  If you are using the service 
inappropriately you may find yourself subject to disciplinary action; 
3. Never install additional Internet access software such as a separate ISP 
connection.  All Internet access must be provided through the corporate 
System; 
4. Refrain from accessing non-business related webcams, video clips, audio 
files, automated downloads, streaming programmes or polling programmes 
via the Internet, as they cause unnecessary congestion on the network; 
5. Subscriptions to chat rooms or instant messaging services requires the 
authorisation of your line manager and will be relevant to your job and 
industry.  Social chatting is not allowed. 
6. Where information from the Internet is used for TOPAZ CC business 
decisions, the integrity and the source of the information must be verified. 
Additionally, care must be taken not to violate any copyright laws when 
using information obtained from the Internet 
 
E-MAIL USAGE 
 
The electronic mail system is provided as an organisational communication tool 
and is owned by the organisation.  The organisation reserves the right to monitor 
all e-mail usage, including opening and reading messages, as required by 
management and the law.  All e-mail usage should therefore be conducted in a 
responsible, effective and lawful manner.  It is important to convey a professional 
image when using e-mail as a communication tool and special note should be taken 
to use proper e-mail content, etiquette and speedy replies.  To maintain e-mail as an 
effective and efficient tool, the following must be adhered to: 
1. E-mail should primarily be used for business-related purposes.  It should 
not be used for private business activities, personal gain, political 
activities, fund raising or charitable activities not sponsored by the 
organisation, amusement or entertainment purposes.  Occasional personal 
use of e-mail is permitted at the discretion of your manager and/or the 
Chief Information Officer (CIO), which is a privilege that should not be 
abused; 
2. Do not use additional webmail such as hotmail accounts, unless authorised, 
or access any other private mail accounts from the organisation’s System 
via the Internet, as this could possibly create virus and bandwidth 
problems; 
3. Do not use the e-mail account assigned to another Individual to either send 
or receive messages.  Also do not forge or attempt to forge e-mail 
messages or disguise or attempt to disguise your identity when sending e-
mails; 
4. Do not automatically forward your internal organisational mail to external 
e-mail addresses.  You will be held responsible for information security 
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breaches resulting from this practice; 
5. Do not send e-mails to all Users on the global address list; 
6. Refrain from sending attachments such as JPEG, JPG and AVI, which 
have a big impact on bandwidth and are not essential to the business; 
7. Do not forward, send or create unsolicited e-mail messages, chain mail or 
SPAM; 
8. Refrain from using the “Reply to All” option when responding to e-mail 
messages, especially when there are more than 10 recipients. 
9. Do not knowingly send information in violation of copyright laws. 
 
STORAGE USAGE 
 
The organisation provides disk space on workstations and servers where Users may 
store organisational information.  To ensure that the storage resources are used 
optimally, the following applies: 
1. Only business-related information may be stored on servers and hard 
drives.  Any files not required for business purposes may be deleted on a 
regular basis at IS’s discretion; 
2. No workstation drives may be shared, rather use alternative file sharing 
methods and tools as provided by the organisation; 
3. Adhere to the disk quotas assigned to you; 
4. Make use of the storage space provided on the network to back-up 
important files.  Files cannot be recovered from a workstation’s hard drive 
should it become faulty. 
 
Removable storage devices can create numerous problems, such as virus infections 
and copyright infringement, and should therefore be used with care.  The following 
applies: 
1. CD/DVD writers are supplied for business and back-up purposes only and 
may not be used to copy other CDs, DVDs, music, software or other 
copyright-protected files; 
2. Removable storage devices may not be used to copy or distribute CDs, 
DVDs, music software or other copyright-protected files; 
3. Removable storage devices must be scanned for viruses before accessing 
any files on them; 
4. The contents on removable storage devices must be encrypted, where 
feasible; 
5. Removable storage devices must have a form of physical identification on 
them to ensure that they can easily be recovered and identified. 
 
INAPPROPRIATE CONTENT 
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The organisation has an important reputation to maintain and as such you must 
never use your workstation to access, view, distribute, copy or print any material 
that would be considered “inappropriate” in the work environment.  The following 
includes (without limitation) inappropriate content and applies to all IT services, 
including e-mail and Internet usage: 
1. Images of obscene or pornographic content including cartoon graphics, 
images of mutilation, disfigurement or death, images of a nature which 
may offend, images of vulgarity, violent or hateful action or images of a 
racial nature which could cause offence; 
2. Messages or text of a sexually-explicit nature including cartoons or jokes, 
ethnic or racial slurs, defamatory, offensive or abusive statements, or any 
other messages that can be construed to be harassment or disparagement of 
others based on their sex, race, sexual orientation, age, national origin or 
religious or political beliefs. 
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Part 1. Movie Questions  
 
1.1 Does the movie make it clear what is expected of you in terms of Information 
Security? 
 Not at all 
 
 To some extent 
 
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
1.2 Have you learned something new regarding Information Security from this? 
 Not at all 
  
 To some extent 
 
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
1.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement: I feel a sense of 
pride working for TOPAZ CC. 
 Strongly disagree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Neither agree or disagree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 
APPENDIX B – SECURITY TESTS 
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1.4 Which of the following with regard to password practices is considered false? 
 You should never share your password 
 
 You are allowed to share your password only with an IS technician 
 
 Your password should not be easily guessable and must contain a mix of 
alphabet letters and numbers 
 
 Your password is your key to TOPAZ CC information 
 
1.5 Which of the following statements are correct? 
 When stepping away from your computer, it is permissible to leave it 
unlocked as long as you switch off the monitor 
 
 It is acceptable to leave sensitive documents/media on your desk before 
leaving the office if you put them under a pile of non-sensitive documents 
 
 When sharing your access details with others, you will not be held 
responsible for whatever they do with them 
 
 We must protect customer information at all times 
 
1.6 Which statement most accurately describes TOPAZ CC’s Acceptable Usage 
Policy requirements for passwords: 
 They should be easily guessable so you can remember them 
 
 They should consist of sequences or repetitive patterns like 1234 
 
 They should be at least 7 characters in length and contain numbers and 
letters 
 
 They should be difficult to guess 
 
1.7 IS personnel call you to inform you that your workstation contains a virus and 
request your password to address the problem remotely. What do you do? 
 Ignore the request and hang up 
 
 Provide your password to the person on the line as requested 
 
 Ask the person for their employee number and then provide the 
password 
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 Do not provide your password and report the incident 
 
1.8 A colleague has requested itemized billing of an TOPAZ CC customer from 
you. What do you do? 
 Provide the requested information to your colleague 
 
 Refer the person to your supervisor or manager to ensure that the 
necessary processes are followed in this regard 
 
 Ignore the person 
 
 Extract the information and then ask your supervisor for permission 
 
1.9 Which of the following passwords conforms to the TOPAZ CC Acceptable 
Usage policy? 
 ab?cd 
  
 wicked 
 
 xFj.rQ43 
 
 michael7 
 
1.10 How can I protect the information in my office: 
 Back up my information daily 
 
 At the end of the day, lock away my sensitive documents 
 
 Never leave my workstation unlocked 
 
 All of the above 
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Part 2. Movie Questions 
 
2.1 Does the movie make it clear what is expected of you in terms of 
Information Security? 
 Not at all 
 
 To some extent 
 
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
2.2 Have you learned something new regarding Information Security from 
this? 
 Not at all 
 
 To some extent 
  
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
2.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement: TOPAZ CC 
is better than any other company. 
 Strongly disagree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Neither agree or disagree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Strongly Agree 
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2.4 You learn about a program that you can download from the Internet that 
enables you to find any song or movie that you want. What do you do? 
 
 Don't download the program 
 
 Download the program and scan it for viruses before installing it 
 
 Search the Internet for reports describing this program 
 
 Download the program and share it with your friends 
 
2.5 You receive an email message from someone you don’t know with the 
following Subject:  “Here is the attachment”. The email contains a file 
attachment called “draft1.doc”. What do you do?  
 Open the attachment 
 
 Save the attachment to disk and scan it for viruses 
 
 Delete the email without opening the attachment 
 
 Forward the email to a friend for comments 
 
 
2.6 According to TOPAZ CC’s Acceptable Usage Policy, the composition of 
your password should: 
 Be at least 5 characters long 
  
 Not be complex 
 
 Contain your user ID 
 
 Not be simple 
 
2.7 Which practices are prohibited at TOPAZ CC? 
 Installing unauthorized or unlicensed software on TOPAZ CC 
workstations 
 
 Making copies of TOPAZ CC licensed software and distributing it 
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 Interfering with security software on workstations 
 
 All of the above 
 
2.8 Which of the following are allowed? 
 Disclosing confidential TOPAZ CC information to unauthorised persons 
 
 Disclosing confidential TOPAZ CC information in public places, for 
example,  by talking on your cell phone in a restaurant 
 
 Making sure only authorized people have access to confidential TOPAZ 
CC  information 
 
 If I require  information urgently, I can use a computer account for which I 
do not have authorised access 
 
Part 3. Movie Questions 
 
3.1 Does the movie make it clear what is expected of you in terms of Information 
Security? 
 Not at all 
 
 To some extent 
 
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
3.2 I know what information security is? 
 Not at all 
 
 To some extent 
 
 Mostly 
 
 Completely 
 
3.3 To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement: I feel committed 
to TOPAZ CC. 
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 Strongly disagree 
 
 Disagree 
 
 Neither agree or disagree 
 
 Agree 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 
3.4 You have had a busy weekend so you decide to do your banking and some 
shopping online during working hours. Which of the following statements are 
in line with TOPAZ CC’s Acceptable Usage policy? 
 You should not do this as it is against company policy 
 
 You are permitted to do this as long as you get approval from your 
department head 
 
 You are permitted to do this as long as the time spent on the Internet 
does not exceed 30 minutes 
 
 Formal approval is not required and you are permitted to do this as long 
as good judgment is followed at all times 
 
3.5 When browsing the Internet a suspicious pop-up window appears. What do 
you do? 
 Respond to the message in the pop-up window 
 
 Ensure that your Antivirus software is enabled before clicking on the 
window 
 
 Close the pop-up window and ignore the message 
 
 Click on the window and follow the related prompts 
 
3.6 Which of the following statements are false with respect to Internet usage?  
 Internet usage is provided to you primarily for business use, although 
occasional use is permitted 
 
 When using the Internet care must be taken not to access inappropriate 
material that other employees may find offensive 
 
 The amount of time you spend on the Internet should be prudent and 
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should not be abused 
 
 Once Internet access is granted to you, you are free to access any sites 
and spend as much time as you like on the Internet 
 
3.7 You receive an email from a friend warning you of a cell phone virus and he 
asks you to forward this to your friends. What do you do? 
 Query the message with IS Security if concerned and discard 
 
 Reply to the sender of the email thanking them for the information 
 
 Send the email to all your TOPAZ CC colleagues 
 
 Forward the email to all your friends warning them of the risk 
 
 
3.8 Which of the following statements are correct? 
 As the resource owner TOPAZ CC has the right to intercept and view all 
electronic communication if it obtains a police clearance first 
 
 As the resource owner TOPAZ CC has the right to intercept and view all 
electronic communication if it suspects its systems are being abused 
 
 TOPAZ CC is only allowed to monitor Internet activity but not email 
activity if it suspects abuse by employees 
 
 TOPAZ CC is only allowed to monitor email communication and not 
Internet activity if it suspects abuse by employees 
 
I know of an information security breach within my business area within the last 
12 months? 
 
 True 
 
 False 
 
 
